   a. That all our knowledge of matters of fact comes from experience via cause and effect (constant conjunction) is confirmed by analogy by the observation that the same is true for animals.
      i. Animals, just as we, learn to expect like causes from like effects, and this cannot be from reason, since they do not possess it.
   b. As with us, animal behavior comes either from learning or from instinct, and learning indeed, being a kind of habit formed from experience, is a kind of instinct.

10. Section X. Of Miracles.
   a. (This is a very long section and amounts in places to a rant, in my opinion.)
   b. No (human) testimony is of sufficient weight in support of the occurrence of a supposed miracle to outweigh a law of nature established by the universal experience of mankind, such as that the dead do not rise. (A true miracle, as opposed to a mere marvel, is a contravening of a law of nature.)
   c. It is hard to interpret Hume here on Christianity. Seemingly he would include the miracles of Christ in this statement, although he also makes the distinction that these miracles are supported by the testimony of God, which can only be believed by faith. Seemingly this statement is contrary to his general argument and is made merely pro forma.
   d. (Note: some of the footnote numbers in this section are displaced by 1.)

11. Section XI. Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State.
   a. The argument of this section is put into the mouth of Epicurus defending himself against a (hypothetical?) charge of impiety for denying divine providence and the immortality of the soul (which he did).
   b. The denial of these theses (divine providence and a future state) does not undermine morality and civil order, for it is universally observed that a life of virtue is happier than a life of vice.
   c. The argument from the design of the universe for the existence of God proves only the existence of a God capable of producing the mixture of order and disorder that we see.
   d. Since God is outside our experience, the type of knowledge from cause and effect that we have of matters of fact cannot apply to Him as the cause of the universe.

12. Section XII. Of the Academic or Skeptical Philosophy.
   a. Part One
      i. Note: This section contains a fairly elaborate critique of Descartes’ *Meditations*, which I’m not sure I completely understand.
      ii. Cartesian (antecedent) doubt is impossible, and if attained, could never be undone.
iii. Given Descartes’ argument, there is no cognitive faculty by which the existence of the external world could be established.
   1. Philosophy has destroyed the reliability of the naive tendency to believe instinctively that bodies exist that have properties similar to our perceptions of them.
   2. But since we can never go beyond our experience, we are left with only those perceptions.
   3. Primary qualities (like extension), as well as secondary (like color and sound), in the first instance, exist only in our minds.
   4. Hence Berkeley’s argument that material substance is a fiction.
      a. While Berkeley’s argument purports to undermine skepticism, it simply reinforces it.

b. Part Two
   i. The Aristotelian and Newtonian continua are incomprehensible, even more so than the abstruse speculations of the theologians.
   ii. But excessive skepticism (carried into the realm of practical affairs) has no good purpose.

c. Part Three
   i. There are two kinds of mitigated skepticism, which may be useful:
      1. To raise skeptical doubts and thus undermine the dogmatism of the uneducated.
      2. To rescue us from confusion by urging us to confine our thought within its proper limits—human affairs.
         a. The only legitimate objects of inquiry are (1) quantity and number, and (2) matters of fact. As for a book that treats of other subjects, “commit it to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.”