Notes on Kant—Installment Two:
“Introduction” to Critique of Pure Reason

1. On the distinction between pure and empirical cognition
   a. All our cognition begins, temporally, with experience.
   b. However, it may be that not all our cognition is derived from (“arises from”) experience.
   c. Cognitions not arising from experience would be “a priori” cognitions.
      (Latin, “antededent” as opposed to “consequent” (“a posteriori”) to experience.)
   d. We shall mean by “a priori” absolutely independent of all experience.

2. We are in possession of certain a priori cognitions, and even common understanding is never without them.
   a. How is a pure cognition to be distinguished from an empirical one?
   b. First criterion: thought with necessity and dependent only on the a priori
   c. Second criterion: essentially universal
   d. Two kinds of a priori cognitions
      i. Mathematical
      ii. That every change must have a cause
   e. Hume’s analysis of causality as constant conjunction destroys the concept completely by destroying its necessity.
   f. We could also show that experience as such is impossible without a priori cognitions.
   g. The concept of body has the irreducibly a priori basis of occupying space.
   h. The concept of an object has the irreducibly a priori basis of being either a substance or an accident.

3. Philosophy needs a science that will determine the possibility, the principles, and the range of all a priori cognition.
   a. There are certain cognitions that apply not only to, but even beyond, all possible experiences.
   b. In these cognitions lie reason’s inquiries.
   c. The problems of reason are God, freedom, and immortality.
   d. The science of these problems is metaphysics, initially dogmatic, that is, not yet having inquired into its power over these subjects.
   e. It would be natural, before launching into such investigations, to inquire into the powers of reason in general,
   f. But it is also natural not to have so inquired, since we have familiar examples of a priori knowledge (mathematics), and since we are likely to confuse the elucidation of pre-existing ideas with new truth.

4. On the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments
   a. Analytic judgments only make clear what is already implicit in a subject concept, while synthetic judgments add something not implicitly contained.
   b. All experiential judgments are synthetic.
c. But some non-experiential judgments are also synthetic. Example: every event has a cause.

5. All theoretical sciences of reason contain synthetic \textit{a priori} judgments as principles.
   a. Mathematical judgments are all synthetic.
   b. They are necessary.
   c. They are ampliative or expansive. (They require an intuition.)
   d. Natural science contains synthetic \textit{a priori} judgments as principles.
      i. Examples
         1. Conservation of matter
         2. Newton’s Third Law (“For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.”)
   e. Metaphysics, at least in terms of purpose, contains synthetic \textit{a priori} principles.

6. The general problem of pure reason.
   a. How are synthetic judgments \textit{a priori} possible?
   b. How is pure mathematics possible?
   c. How is pure natural science possible?
   d. How is metaphysics as a natural disposition possible?
   e. How is metaphysics as science possible?

7. Idea and division of a special science under the name of critique of pure reason.
   a. Such a critique merely judges pure reason, its sources, and its bounds.
   b. This critique is a propadeutic to a system of pure reason, not that system in its entirely.
   c. Pure reason must contain nothing empirical.
   d. Human cognition has two stems, sensibility and understanding, through which objects can be respectively sensed and thought.