1. Note: Protarchus is a son of Callias.

2. (11) Two arguments (logoi): Philebus maintains that rejoicing (to chairein), pleasure (hedonē), enjoyment (terpsis), and their kind, are the best things for all animals, while Socrates maintains that, for those able to partake of them, being wise (to phronein), thinking (to noein), remembering (to memnēsthai), and their kin, right opinion (doxa orthē) and true reasonings (alētheis logismoi), are the best. Each side must agree that the truth about these arguments must be attained by any possible means, and that it is a condition and disposition of soul that produces happiness. Stipulation: if some other life superior to both is found, then that hypothetical best life will be the victor, and between the other two the victor will be the life that is closer to the best. (The most frequently used single names for the two competing lives are respectively to phronein, or phronesis; and hedonē. (??)) (Philebus thinks the goddess Aphrodite = the goddess Hedonē.)

   a. (12c) Problem: pleasure and likewise knowledge are both like and unlike themselves, because they each have various aspects and shapes. Are pleasures, as you contend, all good, because of some likeness, or, as I contend, some good and some bad because of some unlikeness?

   b. (14c) We must investigate this question with the aid of the principle that the one is many and the many are one. This is obvious and common property when applied to things that come to be and perish, but when applied to things like man, ox, beauty, and good, there are perplexities.

      i. (15b) The perplexities (there are textual difficulties here that make it difficult to disentangle the questions):

         1. Do such unities exist?
         2. How do they, while remaining themselves, enter the domain of becoming?
         3. How are they both one and many?

      ii. (15d) The identification of the one with the many arises everywhere from the nature of discourse itself—this identification entrances the young.

      iii. We need to find a better road than attack to resolve this difference.

      iv. (16c) A gift of the gods, of which I am always a lover, although it has often deserted me: all things are sprung from one and many and contain limit and the unlimited. Since this is how things are arranged, we must always posit a single idea in each case, for it is always there to be found, and then must not pass from the one to the infinite too quickly or slowly, but instead note all the intermediate numbers, until we see not only that each thing is one and many and infinite, but also how many it is. Only then can we argue dialectically rather
than eristically. (From the examples to follow it is evident that he is talking about what we would call classification.)

1. (17b) Examples
   a. Letters and the discrete spoken sounds they represent
   b. Musical intervals
   c. Rhythms (elements of dance?)

2. Story of Thoth, inventor of the letters: understanding each is equivalent to understanding the whole they comprise. This is why many = one and what binds them all together. He called them the grammatical art.

3. (18a) Initial investigation using this method—Philebus and Protarchus are incapable of applying the indicated method to pleasure and to wisdom. (This is the first invocation in the dialogue of the Delphic proverb “Know thyself.”)

4. (20b) Another way Socrates can argue his point (perhaps we can avoid the necessity of dividing pleasure and knowledge by showing in some other way that there is a third life superior to both):
   a. The good is perfect and sufficient.
   b. Everything that recognizes it hunts (thēreuei) it and aims at (ephietai) it wishing to catch (helein) and possess (ktēsasthai) it. No one has any interest in what does not lead to it. (A common theme with the Symposium—ktāsthai and boulesthai ktāsthai are used in Diotima’s speech in Symposium where she is talking about desiring (epithumein) what one already possesses (kektēmenos, a form of ktāsthai).)
      i. This seems to be an argument that the good is sufficient.
   c. Pleasure without knowledge is not sufficient.
   d. (On a human level, as opposed to divine) knowledge without pleasure is not sufficient.
   e. Everyone would prefer a life combined of both of these to either of them.
   f. Therefore, neither of these pure lives is the best (unless the mind we are discussing is the divine mind).

5. (23c) Now we must take the third path outlined at the beginning: we must determine whether knowledge or pleasure is closer to the good in the mixed life. Does knowledge or pleasure cause the good in that life? I would argue that it is knowledge that does. A battle for second place.
   a. Socrates: I need a new contrivance to fight mind’s battle—a division of all beings into two classes, the unlimited and the limit, and also a third class, the mixture of limit and the unlimited. Also a fourth class, the cause. Let us collect and divide and determine how the first, second, and third classes are one and many.
   b. (24a) The infinite is what admits of degree, (25a) limit is fixed quantity.
   c. (25e) The mixed class, the offspring of the limit, is that proper ratio
that represents the balance and harmony of things—health, music, good weather, the seasons.
   i. Philebus says Musike did harm; I say she brought salvation.
   ii. The third class consists of every offspring of the first two.

d. The fourth class. Since the third class is what comes to be, and that is what is made, the cause must be a maker.
   i. The creator always leads, and what is created follows. (I think this means that the creator pre-exists the created in time.)
   ii. The cause and the things that serve the cause in generation are not the same (this must refer to the other three classes, including the limit).

e. (27d) Which of these classes do the lives of pleasure, mind, and the mixed life belong?
   i. The mixed life to the mixed class
   ii. Pleasure to the infinite

1. A digression: Philebus says that pleasure must be infinite, for otherwise it would not be the absolute good—Socrates retorts that under that condition pain also would not be the absolute evil—therefore it is not infinity that makes the good.

iii. Mind

1. For all philosophers, mind is king of heaven and earth—but let us investigate its genus (tribe) at greater length
   2. Is the universe planned and ordered, or chaotic? Planned—the assertion that mind orders all is worthy of the spectacle of the kosmos, the sun, moon, and stars, and the revolving [sky] (perhaps this is a reference to the recently discovered [for the Greeks] regularities of the movements of the heavens—this certainly seems to be a form of the so-called argument from design)

3. An argument that comes to us:
   a. The elements in us (earth, air, fire, water) exist also in the universe.
   b. The elements in the universe are superior to and rule the elements in us.
   c. Our body has a soul. What is its cause?
   d. Probably, the universe also has a soul, and a superior one, and the same correspondence holds between the universe and us with respect to soul as holds with respect to body.
   e. (The argument in 30 b and c seems obscure.)
   f. (Soul seems to be classed here with the mixed.)
   g. Cause, which gives measure to all things, also gives our bodies souls.
   h. So in the universe also there are these four
classes, including cause.
   
i. Since it orders and arranges years and seasons and months, it may justly be called wisdom (sophia) and mind (nous).
   
j. No wisdom or mind without soul.
   
k. Thus in the nature of Zeus a kingly soul and mind were implanted through the power of cause, and in the natures of the other gods according to their epithets.
   
4. So mind belongs to the fourth class, the cause.

f. (31b) In what and by means of what affection (pathos) do pleasure and thought come to be whenever they come to be?

   i. Pleasure (and pain) first
   
   1. Pain and pleasure originate in the combined class
      
      a. Pain is the breaking up of harmony and nature in living beings, pain its restoration
         
         i. Examples
         
         1. Thirst
         2. Hunger
         3. Cold
         4. Heat

      b. There is in the soul the anticipation of these things—these are pure pleasures and pains (unmixed with their opposites)

   g. (32c) It is with reference to these pure pleasures and pains that we shall discover whether pleasure in itself is good or whether some pleasures are good and some bad. CLEAR

   i. Argument 1 CLEAR
      
      1. Isn't there an intermediate state between construction and restoration, and devoid of pleasure and pain? Yes.
      2. Couldn't someone live a life of wisdom in this intermediate state?
      3. This is the unmixed state of wisdom that we discussed at first.
      4. The most divine of lives, if the gods feel neither pleasure nor pain—defer that issue to another time.
      5. But this will be a point in mind's favor for first or second place in the final reckoning.

   ii. Argument 2 BECOMES UNCLEAR FROM HERE ON
      
      1. (33c) The pleasure of the soul originates entirely in memory. [The argument does not seem quite to prove this.]
         
         a. Perception, memory and recollection
            
            i. Some affections of the body are extinguished before reaching the soul, while others cause vibrations in both
body and soul, both individually and together.
ii. The soul forgets bodily affections if and only if they do not affect it.
iii. We should say instead that it has want of perception of them.
iv. Perception is a combined motion of body and soul.
v. Memory is preservation of perception.
vi. When the soul takes up again, by itself, something that it has experienced with the body, we say it recollects.
vii. Also, when the soul takes up again, by itself, a perception or coming to be acquainted of which it has lost the memory, this is recollection.
viii. These points will enable us to take up the pleasure and desire (epithumia) of the soul, apart from the body.

b. The nature and origin of desire
i. We have said that hunger, thirst, etc., are desires.
ii. What do they have in common?
iii. A desire is a desire of being filled with that of which it is the desire.
iv. One who is empty desires the opposite of what he feels, namely being filled.
v. But since the body is empty, one’s only means of touching (ephaptesthai) fullness is via the soul via memory.

1. Here there is the puzzling argument about the one who is thirsty for the first time. Since he is empty and has never been filled, he can only contact fullness via soul and memory. Surely this has the implication of the pre-existence of the soul, but this is not stated explicitly.

vi. Therefore, desire is purely in the soul.

vii. Therefore the soul rules the body.

c. The argument (will) show that there is a form of life that is to be desired with respect to affections such as hunger, thirst, etc. (?)
d. (36a) It is possible to have a twofold pain, simultaneously of the soul and the body, and also a mixture of the body’s pain and the soul’s pleasure. HAVE REREAD IN DETAIL TO HERE

e. (36c) It is possible to have false [and therefore bad? Or mixed?] pleasures.

i. Argument 1: Just as opinions can be real but false, so can pleasures, if they are caused by a false cognition (am I over-rationalizing this passage?)
   
   1. The soul is like a book. Memory and sensation together write words in the soul.
   2. Images also.
   3. Pertaining to past, present, and future.
   4. The friends of the gods have mostly true pleasures.

ii. Another argument that there are false pleasures
   
   1. We can attempt to judge concerning the relative intensities of our pains and pleasures
   2. We can err

iii. A third argument that there can be false pleasures
   
   1. If the body is being neither filled nor emptied, there is in it neither pleasure nor pain
   2. We are not conscious of everything that happens to the body.
   3. Therefore there is an intermediate state and life between that of pleasure and that of pain.
      
      a. Are we to accept or reject the view that pleasure is the absence of pain?
      b. Those who say this are repulsed by certain pleasures—those of the sick and vicious, which are the most intense

4. Mixed pleasures
   
   a. Those of the body (mentioned earlier)
i. Like being warm, but becoming cold

b. Those of the body and the soul (also mentioned earlier)

c. Those of the soul
   i. The three kinds of non-self-knowledge:
      on wealth, on beauty, and on virtue (especially wisdom)
   ii. Taking pleasure in a ridiculous friend (both false and bad)
      [why does this make it mixed?]

f. Pure pleasures
   i. Examples
      1. Pure sensations
      2. Knowledge
   ii. Pure sensations belong to the mixed class, whereas violent pleasures belong to the infinite

h. Comparing the pleasure and knowledge in their relation to truth (and beauty)
   i. Pleasure
      1. The pure white, no matter how small, is truer than the mixed.
      2. Likewise with pleasure
      3. Is pleasure always as aspect of generation?
         a. Instrumental and intrinsic goods
         b. Ranking: materials of becoming, becoming, being
         c. Thus, if pleasure is always an aspect of generation, then it cannot be the good
   ii. Testing mind regarding truth
      1. Productive and educational
      2. Of the educational, exact and experiential
      3. Of the exact, common and philosophical
      4. Philosophical, since it concerns the eternal, is the best
      5. (Gorgias can still maintain that rhetoric is more useful)

i. How should pleasure and knowledge be combined in the mixed life?
   i. A road to the good
   ii. They must be mixed well
iii. Truest sections of each? Insufficient
iv. We shall poll knowledge about the pleasures and the pleasures about knowledge, to see what is compatible
v. Pleasure wants knowledge of things around them, and of themselves
vi. Knowledge does not want the most intense pleasures
vii. We have as it were an incorporeal order that shall rule nobly a living body (and the universe)
viii. So our mixture has measure, symmetry, and truth
ix. Knowledge is closer to all these than pleasure
x. Ranking
   1. Measure
   2. Symmetry and beauty
   3. Mind and wisdom
   4. The arts and sciences (true opinions)
   5. Pure pleasures