Notes on *Philebus*, Installment II

Expansion of point in first installment of notes: forms of Greek word customarily translated “form” in Plato and “species” (or sometimes “form”) in Aristotle: singular, “εἴδος,” “eidos”; plural, “εἴδη,” “eida.” [Note to self: I got this macron by using Unicode hex input $0304$ after the “e”.

1. In what kind of thing does each of them (pleasure and reason) reside and under what conditions?
2. Pleasure and pain arise together in the common kind (the third kind, the combination of limit and the unlimited)
   a. Examples of the third kind: health, harmony
3. Pain accompanies the disruption of harmony, pleasure its restoration
   a. Examples: hunger, eating; thirst, drinking; getting too hot, cooling down; getting too cold, warming up
4. The soul sometimes anticipates these processes, and experiences pleasures and pains that are of a different kind from the former.
5. The pleasures and pains of expectation can be unmixed.
6. Maybe pleasure and pain are not good or bad in themselves, but can be either.
7. Isn’t there an intermediate between pleasure and pain, when harmony is neither being disrupted nor restored?
8. This is a third state besides pleasure and pain.
9. The person who has chosen the life of reason could live in this state. It might turn out to be the most godlike, since it would seem to be unfitting for the gods to be in pleasure or pain. Maybe this would support awarding second place to reason.
10. Meanwhile, back to the pleasures and pains of the soul.
11. It depends on memory.
12. We must investigate perception.
13. Two kinds of affections of the body—those that are extinguished before reaching the soul, and those that break through.
14. The soul remains oblivious to the former, not to the latter.
15. This obliviousness is not forgetting, but nonperception.
16. Joint affection of body and soul = perception.
17. Memory is preservation of perception.
18. A difference between memory and recollection.
19. There is recollection when the soul recalls, without the aid of the body, what she had once experienced together with the body.
20. The soul can recall for itself either a perception or a piece of knowledge.
21. We need to grasp the pleasure and desire that the soul experiences without the body.
22. What is desire, and on what occasion does it arise?
23. Hunger, thirst, etc. are desires.
24. Thirst is a desire to be filled, the opposite of what is happening to a person.
25. But the first time a person is emptied, the soul must desire filling through memory.
a. I find this statement confusing—is this an anticipation of the argument that learning is recollection of our pre-existence?

26. Desire is not a matter of the body.
27. Every impulse and desire, and the rule over the whole animal, is the domain of the soul.
28. There is a form of life that consists of filling and emptying and preservation and destruction of animals.
29. Someone can be in between—pained by his condition, and not yet being filled
30. P. Twofold pain: being (or having been) emptied, and also suffering from desire.
31. S. It depends on whether he has hope of being filled.
32. So a person can be simultaneously undergoing pain and pleasure.
33. S. Are some pains and pleasures true and some false?
34. P. For judgments yes, but?
35. S. In a dream a person may imagine that he is experiencing pleasures or pains when he is not.
36. There is judging. (doxazein, to opine)
37. There is also taking pleasure.
38. There are what the judgment and pleasure are about.
39. Even if a false judgment, it is really a judgment.
40. Same with pleasure.
41. Judgment takes on qualifications, but so do pleasures.
42. Both can be great or small, and have intensity.
43. They can both be bad.
44. Likewise, they can both be right or wrong—in the case of pleasure, a wrong one is usually accompanied by a false judgment.
45. What is the difference between pleasures accompanying true and false judgments?
46. True and false judgments are often accompanied by pleasure and pain.
47. Memory and perception lead to judgments.
48. Sometimes someone without a clear view wants to make up his mind.
49. If he makes up his mind he makes a judgment—in company, he may say it out loud and make an assertion.
50. Memory and perceptions seem to inscribe words on our soul. True or false.
51. There is also a painter who points images on our soul.
52. This happens when a person takes his judgments directly from the images formed by memory or perception.
53. Pictures of the true judgments are true, and of the false false.
54. These judgments may pertain to the future.
55. We said we could anticipatory pleasures and pains about the future.
56. The pictures that come to be in us sometimes concern the future.
57. A good, just, and pious man is loved by the gods.
58. An unjust man is regarded oppositely by them.
59. Everyone is full of hopes.
60. There are assertions in us that we call hopes.
61. Also painted images.
62. In good people these are usually true, because they are loved by the gods, in bad people, false.
63. False pleasures are ridiculous imitations of true ones.
64. False judgment is really judgment, though not of anything real.
65. Likewise false pleasure.
66. Also, fear, anger, etc.
67. I think we’ll find that the only way pleasures can be bad is when they are false—we’ll investigate bad pleasures in general more later.
68. We said that when we have desires, body and soul part company and each have their own experiences—it’s the soul that has desires.
69. Under these circumstances pains and pleasures exist side by side.
70. We agreed that pleasure and pain both belong to the unlimited.
71. How do we compare great and small and more and less intense with pleasures and pains?
72. Just as with the objects of vision, doesn’t distance from these things distort them?
73. As objects of perception also, pains and pleasures can be true or false.
74. The difference between the apparent and the true cannot have anything true about it. (?)
75. Pleasures in animals—the kind of life that consists of emptying and filling, etc.
76. S. What would be the consequence if nothing like that took place in us?
77. P. There would not be any pleasure or pain at all.
78. S. But you think that we are always experiencing one or the other and that there is an endless cycle.
79. S. Do we always notice being affected in such ways?
80. P. No.
81. Only great changes in us cause pleasures and pains.
82. Three kinds of life—that of pleasure, that of pain, and the neutral life.
83. Freedom from pain is not the same as pleasure.
84. Let us decide whether there are two states or three.
85. The real enemies of Philebus: those who think there is no pleasure, but only absence of pain.
86. The nature of any character (eidos) is best understood by examining examples of greatest intensity.
87. This happens when people are sick.
88. Also when people are immoderate—when they disobey the Delphic maxim “Nothing too much.”
89. So for both the body and the soul, pains and pleasures are most intense outside of a virtuous state.
90. What about repugnant pleasures—like scratching an itch?
91. These are mixtures of pleasure and pain.
92. There are mixtures of three kinds—that pertain to the soul alone, the body alone, or both the soul and the body.
93. Restoration or destruction produce mixtures of pleasures and pains (?)
94. Various apportionments.
95. What if what is itching cannot be reached? Then we go back and forth.
96. When there is only a little pain, the excess of pleasure drives a person mad.
(?)
97. We have already discussed the case in which the soul is pleased and the body pained, or the reverse.
98. What if the mixture is in the soul itself.
99. Wrath, fear, longing, lamentations, love, jealousy, malice, are mixtures.
100. …comedy…
101.