Supplementary notes on last part of *Phaedrus*

1. A comment on the speeches of Socrates in favor and against the lover who is not in love:
   a. A classic ability for a philosopher to possess is to speak well for and against the same thing (A. J. Ayer story)
   b. Both speeches are based on defining Eros, but they define it differently
      i. The first speech defines it as desire for bodily pleasure. The lover who is not in love, on the other hand, is guided by a calculation of the best. The inferiority of the one who is in love then follows from the general viewpoint of the *Philebus*.
      ii. The second speech defines Eros as a kind of madness in which the vision of beauty reminds the soul of its vision of the Forms. Beauty then begins the process of the growth of wings on the horses of the soul.
      1. The second speech seems to define soul as that which is self-moved and thus without beginning or end.
      2. On the other hand, Socrates resorts to the simile of the charioteer and team to discuss the effect of beauty on the soul.
   iii. There are many resonances with the *Republic*:
      1. Two distinct rankings of kinds of lives (also here with *Philebus*).
      2. The lowest form of character is destined to a place under the earth after death (as in *Republic* and *Phaedo*).
      3. The laws of Destiny (as in myth of Er in *Republic* and in *Timaeus*).
      4. Vocabulary regarding the divine banquet similar to that used in the *Republic* with regard to the Divided Line.

2. A prayer that Phaedrus, the lover of Lysias, may direct his energies towards philosophy.

3. Politicians criticize Lysias for being a speech-writer.

4. S. They are speech-writers themselves (legislation). Great lawgivers regard themselves as godlike (resonance with *Symposium*).

5. Shall we question Lysias about speaking well or badly?

6. It would be an unmixed pleasure (resonance with *Philebus*).

7. If the speech-writer does not know the truth, his speech will lead people astray.

8. Some say the art of speech is not about truth, but about probabilities.

9. One could counter its being about truth by saying that the art of speech and the knowledge of one’s subject are distinct things.

10. The myth of the locusts and the Muses.

11. The Laconian (?) says that a real art of speech requires grasping of the truth (a resonance with the *Philebus*).

12. Phaedrus thinks speech is primarily used in courts and assemblies.
13. Contention in speech.
14. About just and unjust (resonance with *Alcibiades* I and *Euthyphro*)
15. The speaker can make something appear now just, now unjust, and now
good, now bad, to the same people.
16. Like Zeno (resonance with *Parmenides*).
17. So the art of speech is the art of producing resemblances, no matter in what
sphere.
18. Deception about resemblances is easier when there are small differences.
19. Deception requires knowledge of similarities and differences.
20. Therefore, he who pursues opinions and not truth cannot attain a true art of
speech.
21. Examining Lysias’ speech:
   a. We all know the meanings of words that name concrete things.
   b. The meanings of “value-terms” are doubtful.
   c. It is easier to be deceived about doubtful things.
   d. Therefore in doubtful things we must make a methodical division
(resonance with *Philebus*).
   e. Eros is a doubtful thing—therefore we must make a methodical
division concerning it.
   f. I defined Eros in my speech, but Lysias did not, in his.
   g. His speech is helter-skelter—a speech ought to have beginning,
middle, and end, like a living thing.
   h. The inscription on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.
22. Examining Socrates’ speeches
   a. Two kinds of madness—one from human disease, the other from
divine release (in Socrates’ first speech, Eros belonged the first kind,
in the second, to the fourth division of the second kind).
   b. We used collection and division, and arrived at two kinds of Eros.
23. Those who can engage in this are called “dialecticians.”
24. We still have to consider rhetoric.
25. The techniques of rhetoric.
26. Techniques do not constitute art—by themselves, they are like the
   techniques of a doctor who, knowing nothing of illness, does not know when
to apply them.
27. Likewise with poetry and music.
28. We ought to be gentle with those who think they know how to speak, but do
not.
29. Pericles: all the great arts demand speculation about nature.
30. Anaxagoras taught him this.
31. From Hippocrates—a list of questions to ask about a thing (resonant with
   Parmenides’ lesson in *Parmenides*)
32. The orator’s aim is to produce conviction in the soul—therefore he should
   study the soul.
33. The orator must classify both souls and speeches and match them for
   conviction.
34. The teachers of rhetoric will say it has to do, not with truth, but only with probability.
35. Tisias: if the feeble brave assaults the strong coward, neither would tell the truth.
36. But probability is chosen for its resemblance to truth.
37. Therefore, everyone ought to cultivate dialectic, but not for pleasing men, but rather for pleasing the gods, their noble masters.
38. Enough about speech—now writing.
39. Theuth and Thamus: Theuth invented writing, Thamus pointed out that it would harm memory and enable the substitution of apparent for real wisdom.
40. Written words cannot respond.
41. There is another kind of discourse, which is written with intelligence in the mind of the learner.
42. Seeds must be planted in fitting ground.
43. Back to speech-writing.
44. In summary: one possessing the art of speech must know the nature of the subject of his discourse, of the soul, and of speech itself.
45. Writings serve only to remind us of what we already know—it is these words written in the soul that are the true offspring of the speech-writer.
46. Isocrates will outdo all the present teachers of rhetoric, and will even attain something of philosophy.
47. A prayer to Pan.