Definition 1. Theaetetus: knowledge is (sense) perception (aisthesis).

Protagoras gave the same account: "Man is the measure of all things, alike of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not."

However anything APPEARS to anyone, so it IS for that person.

EXPOSITION OF THEAETETUS'/ PROTAGORAS' ACCOUNT

All synonymous according to Theaetetus interpreted a la Protagoras:
  x knows y (x knows that y is z).
  x perceives y (x perceives that y is z).
  x appears to be y to z.
  x is y for z.

Perception is always of what is (perception in a certain respect is of being in the same respect--i.e., for z).

Since this is so, and perception is irrefutable, perception is knowledge.

Secret doctrine: nothing ever is, in or by itself, but everything is always becoming.

Sense quality is something which has arisen in encounter between percipient and some motion.

The same things appear differently to different people, without the things having changed.

Different things appear differently to the same people, without the people having changed.

Therefore, sense qualities cannot reside either in the sense-organ or in the thing sensed.

We must be careful how we state this thesis:

We believe three propositions:
  I. If x remains equal to itself, then x is not increased (decreased) in size (number). ((Contrariety of remaining the same, increasing, and decreasing.))
  II. If nothing is added to (taken away from) x, then x is not increased (decreased) in size (number). ((Definition of increase, decrease.))
  III. If x was not y earlier but now is y, then x became y. ((Transition = becoming.))

These propositions fight among themselves in our mind when we consider the following:
  6 is large re 4 but small re 12.

I am taller than you now, but later, without growing, I shall be shorter than you.
Puzzle: Socrates was not of a certain quantity, Socrates IS now of that same certain quantity, nothing was added or subtracted to or from Socrates.

One of the propositions I, II, III, must be discarded, because if they are all retained, and the puzzle is affirmed, there is a contradiction.

Dump I: Soc both remained the same and increased.
Dump II: Soc increased without anything having been added to him.
Dump III: Soc formerly was not tall, but now is tall without having been increased (without having become larger).

Doctrine of the initiates: the universe is motion (two kinds: action, passion).

From action and passion arise pairs of offspring:

- perceiving/being perceived
  - example:
    - seeing a certain color/ that color being seen

Parents move without changing place, offspring change place.

The agent is only the agent of the given patient, and vice-versa.

- e. g., white is only white for me, here, now;
  - seeing white is only seeing this white.

Nothing as at a standstill—all is relative to correlative action/passion.

Protagoras on dreams and madness:

The actions and passions are wholly different from other actions/passions and have being only for each other. Socrates sick is wholly different from Socrates healthy.

So both percipient and perceived are wholly incomparable with other percipients/objects.

THE BIRTH IS PROCLAIMED.

BAD OBJECTIONS

Objection 1: Why not pig or baboon is the measure? Where is the wisdom of Protagoras? Where is the testing of opinions?

Reply to 1: This objection is worthless. It’s from opinion (probability).

Objection 2: Can I thus know a foreign language just by seeing or hearing it?

Reply to 2 (this time, devised by Theaetetus): We know each of these just to the extent that we see or hear them.
Objection 3: How can you fail to know what you remember? Yet you're not seeing it.

Objection 4: If we know, then we know that we know, but it is not the case that if we see, then we see that we see.

Objection 5: Perception and knowledge have different attributes. knowledge doesn’t differ by being keen/dim, for example.

Reply to 3, 4, and 5: each percipient/ impression is unique.

Summary reply: the wise person changes what appears to/for a person from worse to better.

It is impossible to think that which is not, or to think otherwise than as one is affected.

GOOD OBJECTIONS TO AND REFUTATION OF “MAN IS THE MEASURE”

1st objection: the many think Protagoras” TRUTH is false. So, since everyone’s opinion is true, TRUTH is false.

2nd objection: being able to bring about a good result is grasping what is advantageous, a species of true belief. And, although the Protagoreans might still be able to maintain that honor, justice, and piety do not have natures of their own, for the advantageous (a species of the future), no one thinks all judges are equally correct.

Digression on rhetoric vs philosophy: rhetoric to philosophy is as slavery to freedom. There must always be evils, and they must always be with mortals. Therefore we ought to try to escape them as quickly as we can so that we can become like gods. Virtue and vice are their own rewards. (Resonances with Gorgias.)

REFUTATION OF “ALL THINGS FLOW”

There are two kinds of motion: alternation and change in place. The Heracliteans must be maintaining that all things are always changing in every possible respect.

But if everything is always changing in every respect, then nothing ever either is or becomes anything, and so there is no way in which anything can appear to anyone. Therefore, there are no perceptions or appearances, and therefore according to this definition no knowledge.

FINAL REJECTION OF “KNOWLEDGE IS SENSE-PERCEPTION”

We see through, not by, the senses. How does one compare objects of different senses? (By what do we investigate being and non-being, similarity and dissimilarity, sameness and otherness?)

The soul views them directly: being, likeness, unlikeness, sameness, otherness. Also, beauty, ugliness, good, bad. The soul views the substance (ousia) of these things by itself, reflecting with itself on things past, present, and future.
The soul also perceives sense-- the soul receives sense qualities from birth, but only comes to reflect on them through education and with difficulty.

Knowledge requires truth requires substance requires reflection, and therefore is not sense perception.

(This argument, by being based on comparison and contrast involved in knowledge, seems to presuppose the centrality of collection and division.)

(Knowledge must be something the soul has when by itself it deals with beings.)

(Thus the argument of the Theaetetus appears at this point to incorporate the main conclusions of the Republic about knowledge.)