OUT ON MALIAN TELEVISION: MEDIA AND CULTURE CHANGE IN AN EMERGING COSMOPOLITAN METROPOLITAN CENTER

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Since 1992, year of the transition from a one-party to a multi-party government, urban life in the West African country of Mali has congruently transformed in a number of domains, among them the availability of land and capital to develop new residential neighborhoods, access to global media through satellite television and internet, the telecommunication revolution that has put a cellphone in nearly every hand, and increasing numbers of Malian citizens embarking on international travel. This combination of factors has opened new vistas and stimulated new cultural flows of ethnic identity, media, technology, finance, and ideas1 that offer myriad opportunities for participation in a plurality of cultural styles, including cosmopolitan lifestyles that range from near-total disregard for the local and traditional to a more blended cosmopolitanism that embraces ideas of world culture without losing pride in local traditions and practices. Bamako’s television broadcasts have become a center for the performance of what I will argue is a particularly Bamakois blend of localized cosmopolitanism, to bend a term from James Ferguson’s work on Lusaka.2 Like the citizens of Kumasi3 and the Pentacostals of Lilongwe,4 televised representations of the inhabitants of metropolitan Bamako perform cosmopolitan lifestyles in markedly local idioms.

Cosmopolitanism vs. Localism in the African Metropolis

Modernization, westernization, development, globalization, transnational flows, cosmopolitanism: scholars of African societies have attempted to define and delimit our world-wide rapid social change in many ways, none of them very satisfactory and none of them very useful for very long. Until recently, a linear directionality of change was implicit in the terminology and often explicit in the analysis, presuming the adoption of “western” culture throughout the “non-west,” to borrow a term from Pollock et al. Since the last decade of the 20th century, a number of scholars have refined their thinking to apprehend the complexities of metropolitan African life in more interesting, and accurate, ways. Ferguson for example, urges a reconsideration of the cultural dualism of traditional and modern, calling instead for a refocus on the stylistic contrast between localism and cosmopolitanism.\(^5\) The urban population explosion in African metropolises over the last two decades, he says, has left little time for demarcating “stages and transitions in ‘the urbanization process,’ or to demonstrate how some people are ‘adapting’ to the new modern society while others lag behind in the old, traditional one.”\(^6\)

Some efforts, however, have been made in this regard; for example, Mary Jo Arnoldi’s complex assessment of the role that public monuments have played in the “conversation about cultural authenticity” in the globalizing capital of Mali.\(^7\) There, the construction of monuments throughout the city during the administration of the first democratically elected President served as a focus for the imagination of the “modern,” through memorializing tradition and the past.

Like racial categories, one of the weaknesses of dualistic categories such as tradition and modernity is that they don’t “map neatly” onto different populations, as Ferguson observes. In his study of localism and cosmopolitanism in the urban areas of the Zambian

\(^5\) Ferguson, 37.
\(^6\) Ferguson, 20.
copperbelt, he found no clear class or other social hierarchy correlating with stylistic choices of “tradition” or “modernity”:

So called modern economic occupations and institutional attachments by no means excluded localist style, and cosmopolitan style was no straightforward index of social status or education. At the very highest levels, those with professional employment and education did normally exhibit a cosmopolitan style. But so, in a different way, did many prostitutes and street criminals, who had their own ways of distancing themselves from the expectations and proprieties of "home." Indeed, both cosmopolitanism and localism had their high and low forms, their respectable and disreputable version.8

Few studies beyond Ferguson’s have delved in depth into the processes that lead specific groups of people to adopt cosmopolitan or localist or blended styles in particular contexts, under explicit conditions, especially in African populations. In this essay, I discuss a portion of the results of broad-ranging research I’ve been pursuing over the last seven years, trying to understand the development of strikingly cosmopolitan and yet familiarly local ways of thought and of living in Bamako.

One of the surprising transformations I observed that brought me to this study involves kinship. This is surprising because in the dialectics of local and cosmopolitan, one of the domains particularly resistant to change in most cultures is kinship. Classic kinship theory looks to residential groupings or habitat for information on kinship organization; styles of urban habitat in Bamako are rapidly changing. Along with them, ways of thinking about and structuring marriage and family are shifting. As I have discussed elsewhere, few of the new homes in Bamako mirror the kinds of homes their owners were raised in with regard to either architectural configuration or the array of technologies found within them.9 Fewer marriage contracts are signed under the polygamous option than when today’s home owners were children.

8 Ferguson 1999, 92.
Fewer biological kin fall into the basic kin categories than did at that earlier time. The factors behind these changes are myriad, but what we will explore in this essay are possible correlations between these forms of cosmopolitanism and televised media impacts. In Bamako, there are many types of televised entertainment available from worldwide as well as local production sources. Some of the newer local productions reflect Bamakois ideas about their life in the 21st century. These are the media we will focus on here.

**Habitat and Kinship**

First, an overview of the explosive growth of residential built space in Bamako: As the charts below indicate, in a mere 78 years, the built space of Bamako has increased 60 fold. Bamako has nearly doubled in area again in the past 20 years, and has more than doubled in population, reaching 1.8 million in 2009.¹⁰

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**Growth of Bamako 1918-1996**

Former villages on the periphery of the urban center have been transformed into new city neighborhoods, and the new neighborhoods

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are larger in area and more populous than the old city as a whole. As of the time of publication of Balla Diarra et al’s study, *Structure Urbaine et Dynamique Spatiale* in 2008, there were 50 named neighborhoods or *quartiers*.

In several of the largest of these new neighborhoods, homes are now built to lodge specific subsets of the extended families that, in previous generations, shared a compound-style or *concession* habitation. Research I conducted in 2008 and 2009 indicates that aspects of the divided housing of the extended family directly impact how husbands, wives, and children interrelate, think about, and talk about each other. Within compound-lodged families, the polygynous husband customarily lives in his own house or set of rooms separate from those of his wives and
children, and the wives take turns cooking for the family and spending the night in the husband’s quarters.

In this residential style, all of the man’s children typically refer to each of his wives as “mother” and to each of his other children as “brother” or “sister.” In the newer neighborhoods of Bamako, it is increasingly the case that men who practice true polygyny (actually having more than one wife) find themselves traveling across the neighborhood or even across the city from one night to the next as each wife has her own free-standing villa (single-family home) where she and her children live, and where the husband comes to eat and spend the night, frequently having no house of his own. The separately-housed wives and their children may rarely, if ever, see each other and, increasingly, do not use kin terms to refer to the other wives and their children. In such families, each child has just one mother, even though the father has more than one wife. Another finding of my research was that, for my sample, it is the mother who is expected to ensure that there is at least one television in her matrifocal household.

**Television in Mali**
What a change in a mere 30 years. Until the 1980s, visual technology on most of the African continent had been confined to still cameras, VCRs and videotapes, and restricted television broadcasts existed in just a few cities in a small number of countries. Since then, however, increasing numbers of African countries have begun producing and broadcasting television programs. As Louise Bourgault noted in her 1995 book, *Mass Media in Sub Saharan Africa*, while African nations have been among the last to acquire broadcast television, they have also been among the first to make the leap from oral to audiovisual electronic communication without first transiting through writing and literacy.¹¹

Here, I will briefly summarize the development of television in Africa in order to situate Mali's television productions in their historical context. The first television station in Africa, in 1959, was WNTV in Ibadan, Nigeria. The only other countries which had television before independence were Kenya, Northern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and Southern Rhodesia (Zambia). Most other countries, including Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Congo, Niger, Senegal, Madagascar, Ghana, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, and Zaire, established television service soon after in independence. TV also began at this time in Ethiopia and Liberia. South Africa was not introduced to television until 1976.

The 1980s saw television come to a number of other countries, including Namibia (Southwest Africa) in 1981, Mali, the Seychelles, and Somalia in 1983; Cameroon acquired it in 1986, Chad in 1987, Lesotho in 1988, and Botswana in 1989.¹² By the 1990s, private as well as national television stations had been created in most African countries, with satellite and cable service entering those that previously had no service at all.

Mali received its first television equipment in 1983 through a grant from Libya. The 1980s was a period of increasingly intense culture change in Mali with many social transformations that had begun during

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¹² Bourgeault, 104.
the colonial period and had accelerated since the early years of independence. Adoption of French as the language of instruction, of the French code of law as the model for the Malian legal system, and of European lifestyles among the wealthy elite contributed to re-channeling the aspirations of the young in a decidedly Eurocentric direction. The first generation of Malians who received their formal education entirely in an independent Mali were coming into early adulthood in the 80s and beginning to act as agents of innovation in a culture where gerontocracy was still the rule. The acquisition of the technology of television was seen as an important goal by these young leaders. Initially, at least, the uses of the technology in Mali were largely determined by the intellectuals and technicians responsible for production and broadcast.

One such young man became the driving force behind the inclusion of the performances of griots, *jeliya*, in Mali's emerging television productions in 1984: Zoumana Yoro Traoré. Much of the griot’s artistry used to be performed in relatively private settings among small groups of people or gatherings of family, friends, and neighbors. A large gathering of this sort will bring a few hundred people together. Zoumana used the western broadcast style interview format to bring indigenous Malian artists, griots in particular, to the Malian television public, a much larger audience. His weekly broadcast, *Rencontre Avec Nos Vedettes* (Encounter With Our Stars), became one of the most highly sought-after arenas for performing griots of all ages and levels of experience. Zoumana attempted to give air time to newcomers along with the well-established, and it was under the influence of his broadcast that the term *ngara* — an honorific — became widely translated as "vedette" or "star." Nearly everyone in the practicing griot community wanted to appear on Zoumana's show, especially those who were just starting to build their reputations. For the first time in history, Malian griots had the opportunity, through the technology of television, to perform before audiences in the hundreds of thousands, topping even the capacity of Bamako, Abidjan, and Dakar's largest concert halls and stadiums. This, for a griot seeking fame, was a golden opportunity.

In those early years, as I witnessed them while living in Bamako
from 1984-1988, griots were challenged by the transition from an oral to an audio-visual medium. Not all forms of jéliya were equally adaptable to the new format. Jeli Baba Sissoko, the famous story-telling bard from Segu, initially had his own television show beginning in 1985 in addition to his long-running radio broadcast that people my own age had grown up listening to. But the audience who had spent years sitting enthralled to the sound of his voice accompanied by his 3-stringed instrument, the ngoni, suddenly found it difficult to enjoy watching him do the same thing. They criticized his performance because he sat still, bobbing his head to the rhythms he stroked on his strings while he told his stories. Bamako TV audiences, whose expectations of television behavior were shaped by exposure to foreign productions on video and film before local TV broadcasting began, wanted more action to keep them entertained. So, during his second season in 1986, Jeli Baba began to stand and walk around while he told his stories and played his ngoni. Some of the stories were even shot on location. For others, moving backgrounds were built that scrolled horizontally behind the griot as he performed. Eventually, however, under the weight of widespread criticism and even ridicule, these techniques were given up and Jeli Baba left television altogether, returning his performance of jéliya to its former, purely oral, medium of radio.

Similar types of criticism were made of early performances of griot women, jelimusow, on television. They did not look at the camera, they did not smile — in fact they were often stiff and nervous — and sometimes they did not move very much while singing. The most notable young jelimusow of the late 80s, Ami Koita and Tata Bambo Kouyate, were big hits on television because their performance style was well-suited to the visual technology. Both made eye-contact with the audience, moved gracefully to the rhythms of their songs, and gestured directly at the camera, stimulating strong emotional responses from the television audiences. Their extraordinary oral talents were matched by a fine sense of visual presentation, perfectly suited to the new audio-visual medium.

This was a difficult domain of competition for ordinary griot
women. In the most common of performance arenas, weddings and naming ceremonies, the singing griot was rarely the focus of visual attention. Members of the audience are watching the dancers, the drummers, and, more often, each other. However, as I witnessed during subsequent periods of fieldwork, by 1990 many jelimusow had been successful in adapting their performance styles to suit the demands of audiences whose attention now focused entirely on the images of them which fill the television screens. Much more dance had been incorporated into performances, even of very old repertoires. Singers wore the latest in fashions, recorded their performances in varied settings outside the television studios, and took care to maintain eye contact with the camera and, through it, with their audiences. They had clearly developed an understanding of what the audience would be experiencing while watching their performance framed in the lens of the camera.

Both national and private television production companies in Mali concentrated for the first 20 years or so on news broadcasts, televised soccer matches, and documentary programs about the “traditional” art forms and practices that abound in Malian cultures. As the hours of broadcast lengthened from just three hours each evening in 1984 to an 8:00 am to 2:00 am schedule now, films, television series, and documentaries from elsewhere were brought into Malian homes on the lighted screen. While I lived there in the 1980s, the American sitcom, “Happy Days” was one such program that ran on a weekly basis on Malian national television. In that context, “Happy Days” was a controversial program: the father was perceived as weak and too submissive to his wife; the daughter, Joanie, was appallingly disrespectful to her parents, especially to her father; the most admirable character was the ever-macho and independent Fonzo.

Subsequently, many American programs about families were broadcast and passionately discussed in the gathering places and grins of Bamako: “Dallas” and “Dynasty” were just the beginning of a long line of American television exports that have made their way onto Malian TV. Since the 1990s, numerous productions from other parts of the world have also competed for air time: name a Brazilian, Mexican, or
Australian soap opera, and it is likely that is has run on Malian TV. The schedule in 2011 included a Brazilian production which, unfortunately for me, featured a character by the name of Barbara who was constantly cheating on her husband or inciting her friends to cheat on theirs. The scantily-clad women in that show were often shown making love with even less of their bodies covered, drawing scathing criticism from many sectors of Malian society, but evidently also achieving high enough ratings to continue to be broadcast for four years.13

Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Niger have also entered the competition for Malian air time with a number of entertainment programs through the regional powerhouse broadcast company, Africable, along with a few dramatic series, including one called “The Little Sergeant” about a pair of Burkinabe police partners: a married man and an unmarried woman – a setup that offers myriad opportunities for stimulating public discussion of morals, modernity, and tradition. Equality of the sexes was public policy in Burkina Faso during the days of Thomas Sankara’s Marxist revolution; the subsequent “rectification” of those policies by Blaise Compaoré has not escaped global pressure to attend to women’s rights – a basic tenet of liberal cosmopolitanism.14

**Local Cosmopolitan Television Productions**

In 2011, I conducted a small study of public opinion about two specific Malian television series. Although Mali has had a very active group of feature film producers since the late 1970s, it was not until 2000 that a local television series, *Les Aventures de Séko*, was first broadcast on national TV, produced by one of the very first Malians to have been trained by Libya to shoot and edit video back in 1983, Boubacar Sidibé. Now a major film and television producer on the Malian scene, he built on the success of his first series to garner the support of the French

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13 The Brazilian telenovela mentioned was “Da Cor do Pecado” or “Au Coeur du Péché.” Other series running on Africable in Mali in 2014 include “Gavilanes” from Columbia, “Mar de Amor” from Mexico, and “Saloni” and “Saath Saath” from India.

government’s francophonie funding in 2004 to produce an ambitious
drama called “Dou” or “The Family,” shot in Bamako, acted by Malians,
and broadcast in French.

The family in question is that of a successful middle-aged
business man, Ladji Sacko, who has two wives at the beginning of the
45-episode series. The first wife is an angelic archetype: soft-spoken,
mild-mannered, obedient, always seeking harmony in the household and
above all, the comfort and satisfaction of her husband. She is, hands
down, the character most liked by the Malian audience of all ages. Her
co-wife is a loud, abrasive, self-centered harpy who chastises her
husband as well as the first wife in public, and is abusive to the studious
children of the first wife, but adores her own slacker son. Both wives live
with the husband in a typical compound style arrangement: each does the
cooking and shares her bed with the husband for two nights sequentially.
When Ladji marries a third wife, she moves into a room in the same
compound. Ladji drives a Mercedes in a nod to a world-wide indicator of
wealth, but his sidekick is a nyamakala named Ballo who visits the
compound daily to praise Ladji and/or his wives to gain his daily “tea
money” in the time-honored localist style of the clientage system. The
wives and their children and friends are the ensemble cast from which
story lines spread out over a three year period, all of them dealing with
the cosmopolitics of gender, class, caste, and the polygynous family in
today’s Bamako.

The second series examined in this study was written and
directed by Ousmane Sow in collaboration with the Centre National de
Cinématographie Malien in 2007. Entitled “Le Grin,” this Bamana-
language program concentrated on the lives of a small group of people,
many fewer than the cast of “Dou” whose lives intersect not in the
domestic, but in the public sphere of the gathering place. The Malian
social institution known as le grin is typically a designated area just
outside a family home where a group of people come together for tea and
conversation once a day or once a week. It is a kind of voluntary
association that involves a core group of “members,” usually men
(though there are also women who form grins of their own), some of
whom stay together from high school through elderhood. Younger brothers are often introduced into the grin as tea-boys in their youth, later to become full-fledged members as adults. The members are otherwise usually not related.

Sow took the basic notion of the grin and expanded it to two other gathering places: a neighborhood bar and a “shop” made out of a shipping container which offers pay telephone service as well as beauty products. When I interviewed Sow in 2011, he spoke of the public censure of the series due to its admission of an alcohol-dispensing bar as a type of grin where the daily dramas of Bamako life are lived just as they are in the more typical grin where tea is the preferred beverage. It is Sow’s exploration of the realities of the Malian urban social scene, realities that don’t fit the ideals of a conservative Muslim society, which made the series wildly popular among the youth, but eventually brought it to an abrupt end.

Unlike the characters in “Dou” the personages of Sow’s vision of urban life include no angels and no archetypes of tradition. There are four women: a divorcee, a determinedly single business woman, a villageoise who gets caught up in the temptations of the city, and a wealthy lesbian. The male characters include a Rasta man who makes the tea, deals drugs, and becomes the kept man in a same-sex relationship; a heterosexual ladies man who goes to jail for dealing drugs; a laconic and philosophical barkeep who looks the other way when his customers’ trips to the bathroom stretch out into afternoon dalliances in one of the rooms out back; a griot who frequents only the bar; a Dogon who plays the comedic fool; a drunkard medical doctor, a cowardly attorney who uses the bar as a hideout, and a flamboyantly feminine gay man who is addressed by his best female friend as “ma Chérie,” a term of endearment usually reserved for women and their close girlfriends. All of these characters were drawn from what Sow perceives as the modern Bamakois, ordinary people struggling with the problems of everyday life and love and dreaming of financial success, of international travel, of access to better things – the same kinds of issues that are important in the lives of young people all over the world. In 2011, I surveyed an
opportunistic sample of Bamako residents ranging in age from 15 – 66 years old to ascertain attitudinal responses to these two television series.

The data reported here are from respondents from 20 and older, those being the ones who have lived through the social fluctuations since the revolution of 1991. The sample is uneven in that the cohort of 20-29 year olds is by far the largest (N=41), followed by the 30-49 year olds (N=25) and a much smaller cohort of 50-66 year olds (N=9). Though this is not an ideal sample in any social scientific sense, it is actually fairly representative of the population as a whole in terms of the respective numbers in each age cohort. As with most African countries, Mali’s demographic chart is a pyramid, with the broad base being the youth. In the case of the first two cohorts, more women than men were surveyed while the third group had only one female member. The survey asked about caste status, religion, educational status, type and neighborhood of lodging, television-viewing habits, and opinions about the two television
series in question.

The theme of “Dou” is a song in Bamana about the relationship of the nature of the family to the quality of the society that is summarized in its French slogan: “Toute bonne société est composée de bonnes familles” – “Every good society is comprised of good families.” Boubacar Sidibé, the director, told me that he wanted the program to reflect the realities of life in a polygynous family, which he (like almost every man I asked) believes to be the most common family type in Mali today. In fact, fewer than 50% of families in Bamako include more than one wife, even though the marriage contract signed by the couple would permit more. It was Sidibé’s opinion that the family depicted in “Dou” represents a good family – not perfect – but an example of the kind of family that a strong society is built upon.

The Bamakois I surveyed largely did not agree:

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Only 32% of all respondents thought the family in “Dou” was representative of a good family. Among the 30-49 year old cohort, only 9% were of this opinion, and among the 50-66 year old cohort, only 2 of
the 9 persons considered “Dou” the representation of a good family. Reasons given for not considering it a good family focused on the characters of the father, Ladji, and his second wife. The father is perceived as unjust and incapable of treating his wives equally as Islam demands, and the second wife is considered too much of an agent provocateur whose jealousy, selfishness, and rivalry are unseemly.

When asked what the most important message of “Dou” might be, the majority in all cohorts stated that it is a celebration of the polygamous family today. The social ideology that polygamy is the predominant form of marriage in Bamako - a highly salient local and “traditional” construction - is supported by the centrality of the principles of polygyny depicted in the show where the husband is always considering whether to take another wife, and in fact is urged to do so by his scheming third wife.

Where there were interesting differences in interpretation among the age groups was in the percentages of respondents who felt that the most important message of “Dou” is a critique of the morals of urban Bamako today: among the 20-29 cohort, only 12% saw it as critical; among the 30-49 cohort, 16% held that view; and among the 50-66 year olds, 33% considered it a critique. For the latter group, most of who grew up in and currently live in truly polygynous families, the representation of that lifestyle found in “Dou” is a distasteful one.

An even wider gap between the generations is manifest in attitudes towards the message and depictions of social types in “Le Grin”, a program that was almost universally known to the youngest respondents, but only to slightly less than half of the oldest: Only one member of the 20-29 cohort claimed to have never seen the show, compared to 32% of the 30-49 year olds and 56% of the 50-66 year olds.
A similar disparity is evident in their attitudes toward the most controversial of the characters: the gay man named Poupette, the wealthy lesbian, Bebe, and the purposefully single business woman, Flinty, who eventually rejects her boyfriend in favor of a same-sex relationship with Bebe, all of them situated toward the tradition-rejecting end of the cosmopolitan spectrum:
Among the younger generation, Poupette was the favorite of 86% of the respondents. When I interviewed Sow in 2011, he claimed that Poupette had become the darling of all Bamako before pressure from the religious conservatives and correlate lack of funding forced the cancellation of the series. When one considers that youth constitute over 45% of the Malian population, one can see how that might be the case. In my study, the percentage of Poupette’s fans dropped dramatically from generation to generation: the 30–49 year olds were divided among the three characters fairly evenly, but NONE of the elders liked any of them.

Some might argue that Poupette’s popularity among the youth is unsurprising, given that the effeminate male is a stock character in traditional Bamana theater, Koteba. In fact, Sow told me that he had learned the basics of theater by watching Koteba in his early years, and had established himself on the Malian theatrical scene by adapting Koteba to the stage, so it is natural to see elements of the same forms of humor throughout the body of his work. Poupette, however, is not merely a stock character. The Koteba effeminate man is powerless, a figure to be laughed at at best, derided at worst. Poupette has power, the power – quite literally – of the purse. He pursues a relationship with a heretofore explicitly heterosexual man by showering him with money and gifts, turning him into a “kept” man. Poupette carries the latest cosmopolitan style in handbags, travels abroad, and looks cross whenever anyone refers to him as “he.” Flinty, his best friend, always addresses him as “Ma Chérie.” Flinty, the stalwart single woman, eventually cedes both economic and personal control to the butch lesbian, Bebe, who gains her fortune through international trade, rides a motorcycle, and beats Flinty when she finds her talking to one of her past boyfriends.

As for the most important message of “Le Grin,” none thought that the show was intended just for entertainment. 90% of the youngest cohort stated it is an accurate depiction of life in Bamako today, an opinion shared by only 44% of the two older cohorts. A substantial number of them - 22% and 24% respectively - view it as a critique of the

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15 As Alioune Sow argues, comedy connects these locally-produced television series to the tradition of Koteba (Sow 2009:65).
moral degradation of urban Malian life, an opinion shared by a small fraction -12% - of the younger generation. When I asked Sow about his motivation in having two homosexual characters play such important roles in this series, he said he wanted to open the Malian mind to the kinds of social upheaval he had witnessed in Europe during his university studies. He had seen gay men and lesbian women struggling for their rights there and had been moved by their determination. He wanted to bring that cosmopolitan issue home and give it a local flavor. The National Center for Malian Cinematography, which financed the production, took that risk with him.

The substantial generation gap in responses to these two local television productions is, I believe, indicative of the progress and process of the cosmopolitanization of the citizens of Bamako. As with many forms of social change, the older generations will resist or adapt more slowly, while the younger ones leap onto the modernization bandwagon with alacrity. It came as no surprise that 76% of the 20-29 year old cohort live in the new quartiers, while 67.5% of the two older cohorts lived in the older sections of the city. Accident of an opportunistic sample, perhaps, but more reason to return to do a larger, more statistically representative survey. What has been the impact on these cosmopolitan trends of the year of crisis that Mali endured in 2012-2013? How are the increasingly conservative religious practices of the citadins affecting what is produced for television and what is watched? How will responses to similar productions, whether local or imported, change as the younger generation begins to marry and have children? These are some of the questions this small study has raised, that I hope will be answered by future research, either my own, or perhaps that of a younger MANSAden.

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