Controversy and Correspondence

AGAINST "THE SYSTEM OF THE SUTURE"

These remarks are occasioned by Daniel Dayan's article, "The Tutor-Code of Classical Cinema" (Film Quarterly. Fall 1974).

Dayan is interested in what he calls the "system of enunciation" basic to "classical" cinema.

He writes, "Structuralist critics such as Barthes and the Cahiers du Cinéma of Young Mr. Lincoln have shown that the level of fiction is organized into a language of sorts, a mythical organization through which ideology is produced and expressed. Equally important, however, and far less studied, is filmic enunciation, the system that negotiates the viewer's access to the film—the system that 'speaks' the fiction."

The system of enunciation of classical cinema, the "tutor-code" which "speaks the codes on which the fiction depends," is, according to Dayan (here as elsewhere in the article in large part summarizing the ideas of Jean-Pierre Oudart, who in turn draws on many sources) the system of the suture.

This is not the forum for a detailed criticism of Dayan's position from a theoretical point of view. Such a criticism might well systemically investigate his use of terms such as "ideology," "system," "codes," "classical cinema," "fiction," "enunciation," "de-construction" and so on—each of which is used in a way loaded with theoretical implications which could be challenged. Nor for a thorough analysis of the prose strategy of invoking—and assuming the authority of—a body of writing that is only partially explained, left unavailable to the ordinary reader's independent criticism. Nor for a critical account of the inter-penetration of structuralism, semiology, modernism, and Marxism which finds expression in Oudart and the other writers Dayan cites.

I will rather concentrate on what I take to be clear-cut flaws in Dayan's argument.

According to Oudart/Dayan, the system of the suture is grounded in a two-shot figure. This figure causes the viewer's experience to conform to a certain scenario.

In the first shot, the viewer discovers the frame.

When the viewer discovers the frame—the first step in reading the film—the triumph of his former possession of the image fades out. The viewer discovers that the camera is hiding things, and therefore distrusts it and the frame itself, which he now understands to be arbitrary. He wonders why the frame is what it is. This radically transforms his mode of participation—the unreal space between characters and/or objects is no longer perceived as pleasurable. . . . He feels possessed of what he is prevented from seeing. He discovers that he is only authorized to see what happens to be in the axis of the glance of another spectator, who is ghostly or absent. This ghost, who rules over the frame and robs the spectator of his pleasure, Oudart proposes to call "the absent-one."

In the second shot, the reverse-field shot of the first, "the missing field is abolished by the presence of somebody or something occupying the absent-one's field. The reverse shot represents the fictional owner of the glance corresponding to shot one."

The first shot as it were opens a hole in the spectator's imaginary relationship with the filmic field. This hole is "sutured" by the shot of the character presented as the absent-one of the preceding shot. Then "the spectator can resume his previous relationship with the film."

At the same time, the second shot constitutes the meaning of the first shot, and the system of the suture makes a "cinematographic statement" out of the pair of shots. The first shot presents, say, a view looking across Bodega Bay to the Brenner home, and as it were raises the question, "Whose view is this?"* The second shot presents itself as

* Throughout, I will use this example from The Birds. The sequence is analyzed in detail, shot by shot, by Raymond Bellour in Cahiers du Cinéma, no. 216 (Oct., 1969) pp. 24-38.
answering that question, and thereby revealing the meaning of the first shot. It is Melanie Daniels's view.

It is Oudart's, and Dayan's, central contention that this system is an intrinsically tyrannical one. "It does not merely convey neutrally the ideology of the fictional level... It is built so as to mask the ideological origin and nature of cinematographic statements." The first shot raises a question as to the source of the image. The second shot identifies that source as a character within the fiction. The two-shot figure constitutes a statement about itself. This statement is a lie.

Dayan argues that this sequence of "experiences" (the viewer's discomforting discovery of the frame; his uncertainty as to why the frame is what it is; his realization that he is only authorized to see what is contained in the glance of an "absent-one" who rules over that frame; his acceptance of the figure shown in the subsequent reverse shot as that sovereign "absent-one") is not contingent: it is the effect of a system.

But what is the "system" of which the above outlined experiences are effects? Studying Dayan's article, it becomes clear that he has not in fact described any mechanism which could cause a viewer to "discover the frame," and so on.

I see this failure as linked to a general uncertainty as to the actual role of the "system of the suture" in classical film. At times, Dayan writes as if it were the "system of enunciation" of classical cinema ("The system of the suture is to classical cinema what verbal language is to literature," etc.). But at other times (e.g., in a footnote that appears added as an afterthought, despite the apparent centrality of the point it registers) he modifies the claim: it is one of the central enunciation systems of classical cinema (although still a "privileged" one).

The Oudart/Dayan scenario is predicated on a "previous" relationship which the viewer is said to enjoy with the film—an initial relationship that is supposedly disrupted by the viewer's discovery of the frame, and to which he returns when that disruption is "sutured." Dayan understands this to be a relationship in which the viewer "sees" rather than "reads" the film. This relationship is comparable to the relationship between spectator and representational painting, as Oudart analyzes it.

Then how and why is this relationship disrupted?

Is it that film "naturally" disrupts this relationship? If that were the case, there would be no need for an explanation of the means by which classical cinema effects such a disruption, nor for an account of its (historical) motivation. Is it that this disruption is the necessary consequence of cutting from shot to shot in a film (as Dayan seems to suggest at one point)? But then it would need to be explained why shot changes were ever instituted.

In fact, the natural suggestion is that the strategies and "rules" of continuity cutting developed by Griffith and his contemporaries and followers (crystallized in the "30° rule," the "180° rule," etc.) constituted precisely a system for sustaining across shot changes just that relationship between the viewer and the film that Dayan takes to be disruptive by the viewer's discovering of the frame. That meant that the "system of the suture" was—for some reason, and in some manner—inaugurated despite the priority of a system which would appear to have satisfied the demands of bourgeois "illusionism." Given the system of continuity cutting (which would seem to have made film an extension of painting's system of representation), the viewer had to be made aware of the frame for the "system of the suture" to be instituted. How this awareness was effected, and what motivated the institution of this system, then become questions crucial to our understanding of "classical cinema" and its history.

Although I cannot argue this claim here, I would wish to assert that once the relationship between continuity cutting and the "system of the suture" (that is to say, point-of-view cutting)* is opened up to serious investigation, Dayan's assumption of a "previous relationship" in which

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* Dayan avoids the term "point-of-view shot." I see no reason to follow him in this. The kind of shot whose frame is discovered in his scenario is what everyone knows is called a point-of-view shot. Dayan's terminology gives us no way of referring to the "figure" of which the point-of-view shot is part. If we call it a
the viewer "sees" the film image as unmediated image of reality will have to be challenged. The time has come for a re-examination of the whole idea that classical narrative continuity is "illusionistic." I will here only suggest that Dayan's avoidance of a serious consideration of the historical motivation of the "system of the suture" and his avoidance of a serious consideration of continuity cutting in general, are aspects of a single strategy.

Once we address ourselves to the question of how the viewer actually reads a point-of-view shot, a fundamental error in the Oudart/Dayan scenario becomes apparent.

The scenario presumes that the "system of the suture" is based on a two-shot (view/viewer) figure: a pair of shots which together constitute a complete cinematographic statement.

But in fact, the point-of-view shot is ordinarily (that is to say: always, except in special cases) part of a three-shot (viewer/view/viewer) sequence.

Typically, such a sequence is initiated when, within an "objective" shot, a character visibly attends to something outside the borders of the frame. For example, Melanie looks out from her boat to something we cannot see. This constitutes a cue that the next shot may be a point-of-view shot presenting that "absent-view" to the viewer. Sure enough, we get the shot looking across the Bay, as if in response to the question, "What is she looking at?" (or "What does she see?"). Then we get a "reaction shot," which shows us Melanie's reaction to what she has seen, and at the same time confirms that the previous shot was from her point of view. (As is usual with Hitchcock, no particular identifiable emotion is registered in the reaction shot.)*

Thus the point-of-view shot is ordinarily introduced by a shot which calls attention to its own frame by indicating (by a cue) that there is something about to be shown that lies outside the boundaries of that frame. This cue is a condition of the viewer's discovery of the frame of the point-of-view shot itself. The viewer recognizes this as a point-of-view shot from Melanie's point of view in part because the cue establishes the significance of Melanie's absence from the following frame. The viewer perceives Melanie as significantly absented from that frame, and hence indirectly perceives the frame. This perception is a condition of the viewer's reading of the shot as one from Melanie's point of view.

Note that this specifically reverses the Oudart/Dayan scenario. It is not that the viewer discovers the frame of the shot looking out across Bodega Bay (unaccountably), infers a sovereign "absent-

* Two points:

(a) The third shot can double as the initial shot of a second point-of-view sequence. The shot that presents Melanie's reaction to what she has just seen also shows her continuing to look. Thus it contains a cue that prepares the viewer for another point-of-view shot. An extended series of telescoped point-of-view sequences can be constructed in this way. (This is in fact the case at this point in The Birds.) Dayan's model cannot easily accommodate this possibility.

(b) A general distinction can be drawn between point-of-view sequences which attribute a particular (psychological) reaction to the character whose view is presented, and sequences which provide no psychologically unambiguous reaction shot. The Hitchcock point-of-view sequence ordinarily authorizes the viewer to accept with no possibility of doubt that the character has seen what the point-of-view shot has just shown. The meaning of that view is not revealed by the character's "reaction," but in the actions he proceeds to take which acknowledge, or withhold acknowledgment of, what he has witnessed.
one” and falls prey to a tyrannical system which makes him take Melanie, shown in the reverse shot, to be that absent-one. Rather, following upon the first shot of the sequence with its conventional cue that asserts its frame, the viewer perceives Melanie’s absence from the next frame. Perception of this specific absence is a condition of the viewer’s reading of it as a shot from her point of view. This reading is confirmed by the third shot of the sequence, with its return to Melanie.

No ghostly sovereign is invoked by the point-of-view sequence.

According to the Oudart/Dayan scenario, the viewer discovers that he is “only authorized to see what happens to be in the axis of the glance of another spectator, who is ghostly or absent.” This ghost rules over the frame and robs the spectator of his pleasure. The implication is that it is this ghost who “authorizes” the shot we are presented, who is responsible for the film, who produces the image. Thus when we accept as that “absent-one” the figure shown in the reverse shot, we are accepting what is in reality a fictional character created by the film as the creator of the film. We accept a lying statement as to the film’s real source or production.

But when the viewer takes Melanie to be the “owner” of the glance corresponding to the point-of-view shot, he in no way regards Melanie as authorizing that shot. On the contrary, the point-of-view shot is read as an appropriation of her gaze. It is read as unauthorized by her.

The point-of-view sequence, then, ordinarily manifests the film’s power of appropriating a character’s gaze without authorization. It does not then present a figure and force the viewer to accept it as the source of that power.

Thus the point-of-view sequence in itself does not constitute a lying statement about its own real origin. Melanie is not presented as the real source of the image we read as “hers.” The image of Melanie is manifestly derived from the same source as the image that we read as an appropriation of her gaze. Again, the sequence in itself does not constitute a statement about that source. (But the possibility cannot be ruled out a priori that the film as a whole inscribes a statement about that source, which may truthfully acknowledge that this is a film and its world is not present.)

Dayan writes as if viewers did not know what point-of-view shots were, as if they did not possess the category of the point-of-view shot. But of course, films that use point-of-view shots are designed for viewers who are familiar with their logic, who know how to recognize and read them.

I have spoken of the viewer’s perception of “cues” that lead him to read the subsequent shot as a point-of-view shot. It is perfectly possible for a viewer to recognize such a cue and to read the point-of-view sequence correctly whether or not he has had any particular “experiences” at all. A point-of-view sequence does not depend for its reading on its “effects.” It is an error to suppose that point-of-view sequences simply correspond to some “system” that can be defined by its “effects.”

Not only is a point-of-view sequence not dependent for its reading on any particular effects, but its reading also does not depend on the viewer’s acceptance of the reality of the world projected in the film. The viewer can “read” a point-of-view sequence whether or not he takes the film’s world to correspond to “reality.”

Dayan has given no argument that counters the commonsense position that the “effects” of a point-of-view sequence depend on the sequence, its context within the particular film, and also on the viewer’s stance toward it. So too, whether a point-of-view sequence is integral to an ideological project of a particular kind depends on the sequence and on the film. And whether a film’s ideological project is successful—whether a viewer will actually submit to a film designed to tyrannize—depends in part on the attitude of the viewer.

Part of what I am saying is that the point-of-view sequence in itself makes no statement about reality—that is, makes no statement—at all.

Christian Metz erred in his supposition that a single shot in a “classical” film is equivalent to a sentence. As Dayan shows, a single shot is ordinarily incomplete (“grammatically”). But Dayan in turn is wrong in concluding that a “sutured” sequence of shots in itself constitutes a
statement. The point-of-view sequence, with its syntactical structure, is analogous to a sentence, not a statement. In itself, it makes no claim that is true or false.

Films have been used in many ways. The making of various kinds of statements is, historically, among the uses of "classical" films. In order to make its statement, a film may require that a particular point-of-view sequence be placed in a specific setting within it.

Again, it seems to me that it is the film and not the sequence that constitutes the statement (if the film makes a statement). The statement thus made by a film may be, at one level, a statement—lying or truthful—about itself. Whether a film makes a false statement about itself, or about the world, cannot be settled merely by determining whether the film incorporates point-of-view sequences into its form.*

I think it is clear that Dayan has not succeeded in demonstrating that a point-of-view sequence as such, by its very nature, necessarily turns any film that depends on it (and thus the whole body of "classical" films) into a system of bourgeois ideology. Distinctions have to be made, grounded in serious acts of criticism, and integrated into a serious history.

But Dayan's argument was designed as a demonstration that such distinctions do not have to be made. If classical cinema depends on a system of enunciation that is by its very nature ideological (bourgeois), then criticism and history can be reduced to (replaced by) "de-construction."

Dayan begins from the assumption that he already knows what "classical cinema" is: a bourgeois ideological system. Of course, he also assumes that he already knows what "bourgeois ideology" is. Dayan's writing reveals the attitude that "bourgeois ideology" and "classical cinema" are a-historical absolutes, linked by their essences which may be abstracted from history. Throughout Dayan's article, there is an unacknowledged tension between the Marxist trappings he adopts and the fundamentally anti-Marxist idea that point-of-view sequences and hence "classical" films are by their very nature (regardless of history) reflections of a timeless bourgeois ideology.

The commonsense position would appear to be that "classical cinema" has through its complex history served a variety of masters. "Classical" films, to be sure, have in countless cases served many different forms of bourgeois ideology. But they have also been instrumental in concrete attacks on particular ideological forms. Nor has Dayan said anything which would rule out the possibility that there have been "classical" films that were their own masters.

We ought not to let ourselves feel constrained from the outset to deny on a priori grounds that there are fundamental differences among point-of-view sequences and the films that use them.

Dayan argues that Wind from the East resorts to an alternative system of enunciation in formulating its anti-bourgeois acknowledgment of its own form and production. But Man with a Movie Camera would appear to be no less anti-bourgeois for its systematic use of point-of-view technique (Vertov can be said to use point-of-view sequences in this film as a tool for his deconstruction of conventional narrative forms).* And I have been working on a critical analysis of late Hitchcock films which attempts to demonstrate that Hitchcock attacks conventional uses of point-of-view

* Dayan is clearly wrong as well in suggesting that the shot of the "owner" constitutes the meaning of the point-of-view shot. If that were so, what is contained within the frame of the point-of-view shot itself would be irrelevant to its meaning. That is hardly plausible. The point-of-view shot has significance within the film, which arises in part from the identity of the character whose view it is, in part from the occasion of his act of viewing, and in part from what is contained in the view itself. In the same way, the meaning of an utterance "in the real world" is determined by the identity of the person who utters it, by the specific circumstances of his act of uttering these words, and also by the meanings of the words he utters.

* Linda Podheiser has analyzed Vertov's use of point-of-view technique in an unpublished paper.
form by taking its logic absolutely seriously. Hitchcock does not "deconstruct" the fundamental forms of "classical cinema": he acknowledges the meanings his films have accorded them. Again: what we need is a serious history of cinematic forms, grounded in critical analyses of the significant uses to which these forms were put.

Dayan proposes in place of such a concrete history an a priori demonstration that certain forms of cinema are destined by their nature to serve bourgeois ideology, and thus do not stand in need of serious critical acknowledgment.

—WILLIAM ROTHMAN

Reviews

AMARCORD

Fellini has spoiled us. For over twenty years now, he has regaled us with a series of increasingly fanciful films, explosions of color and decor that were stamped with his own extroverted personality. In film after film, Fellini seduced us with his frescoes of carnival decadence, his sensuous world of jaded aristocrats, circus clowns, and grotesques.

Some people, though, didn’t want to be invited to the Fellini party; the nay-sayers regarded Fellini’s exuberant fantasies as self-indulgent betrayals of his neorealist roots. As if in answer to his most outspoken critics, Fellini has now offered us a modest humanist comedy for which he’s received almost unanimous acclaim. The critical response to Amarcord has been that Fellini has finally put aside the excesses of his baroque mannerist phase in order to return to his original sources. Many critics have responded with almost a sense of relief, as if Fellini has purified his art by reuniting his work with his “noblest” impulses.

I disagree. Amarcord may be the director’s warmest, most subdued film (who goes to Fellini for warmth and good nature?), but it is also his safest. I miss the grand flourishes, the master showmanship, the epic heightening, that I’ve come to expect from Fellini. Amarcord lacks the vigor and drive, the joyous high spirits and sense of release that have been for me the chief pleasures of Fellini’s work. Though it’s true that Fellini has begun to repeat effects, and even to parody himself, his recent films were all charged by a sense of experimentation and a love of film form that was infectious. Amarcord simply doesn’t have the brio and the flair of the best Fellini.

Critics who regard the film as a return to the humanist realist tradition are mistaken: Amarcord is a trimming away, a paring down, rather than a return to the style of his earliest films. Though Fellini’s first efforts were nurtured by the postwar neorealist films of DeSica and Rossellini, Fellini has always shown impatience with strict realism. Rather than objectively recording the surfaces of Italian life, he always worked from personal predilections that hardened into obsessions. In his own richly imaginative way, he combined the two strains that have always dominated Italian movies: the epic tradition, with its fondness for spectacle and operatic gesture, and the humanist tradition with its deep feeling for the outcast and the oppressed.

Since Juliet of the Spirits in 1965, Fellini has emphasized spectacle at the expense of characterization. Largely bypassing the concern for individual character that marked La Strada and Nights of Cabiria and the literary and philosophical speculations that enriched La Dolce Vita and 8½, Fellini went on to entertain his audience with a procession of extravagant, mostly erotic, fantasies. (Fellini Satyricon, a cornucopia of florid hothouse images, is the masterpiece of this late phase.)