Planks of Reason

Essays on the Horror Film

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Conditions of Pleasure in Horror Cinema

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Contemporary film theory has begun a movement away from study of a film *in itself*—as an autonomous text—towards the analysis of its social, economic, and psychological context. Over the past decade, Marxist and psychoanalytic studies have proliferated in the journals precisely because they attempt to consider cinema not as a finished product but as a process of production. Cinema is seen less as an aesthetic object than as a communication with a viewing subject who has adapted *to* the text and who, in part, has been produced *by* the institution of cinema itself. What many of us study is the cooperation between the industry and the viewer in the event of movie-going. This shift of emphasis in film theory toward the role and the "place" of the viewer is paralleled in literary study by the work of the German reception theorists Iser, Jauss, and Stierle, among others. I believe that their approach can be enormously useful in understanding the interaction between the off-screen viewer and the onscreen text. However, the work of these men deals primarily with questions of "meaning." My interrogation of horror cinema is centered, instead, on the question of pleasure.

PART 1

Reception theory proposes that meaning does not lie *in* the film but is the result of a "cooperative enterprise" between the producers/exhibitors of the movie and those who choose to receive it.[1] Viewing is as much an action as a passion. There is no total consumption of a movie, no ideal viewer who completely shares the complex of codes "put in" the film by its artists, the industry and the culture that produced it. But this is not to say that meanings (in which I include emotional responses) are wholly individual or situational. The viewer does not impose *any* meaning whatsoever upon the text. Rather, the film guides the viewer's responses, initiating "performances" of meaning. The text proposes, the viewer disposes. Viewers "realize" the text according to their own interests, but in order to enjoy the movie, they collaborate with the text in such a way that the spectators' interests and those of the industry coincide.[2]

What the film industry sells to the viewer is not a material *thing* but an experience, or a promise, of pleasure. To study the pleasure economy of cinema is, then, to investigate how the industry produces and patterns texts that yield enjoyment to the viewer as well as a return of capital. These are texts that lure the viewer to the movies by offering "dangerous" visions of potentially traumatic material—violent, erotic, or otherwise excessive scenes from which, outside the theatre, we are expected to turn away in shame, guilt, or emotional turmoil. Yet at the same time that it threatens to transgress prohibitions, the industry promises a vision that the viewer knows will be psychologically and ideologically *safe*. By the terms of the viewing contract, desire will be engaged, then domesticated by the textual strategies; fear will be aroused, then controlled. In short, the industry offers the viewer a well-defended fantasy, rather than the lawless vision described by Metz.[3] As the psychoanalyst J. B. Pontalis says, "the dream screen should not only be understood as a surface for projection, it is also a surface for protection—it forms a screen."[4] Cinema is never the raw vision of desire, but a compromised text that defends itself (and the viewer) against its own promise (or threat). In other words, the experience of cinema is simultaneously a screening and a screening-off.[5]

What I call the *good movie experience* is simply a satisfying session at the movies. It is the experience of pleasure felt when everything in the movie seems to work *for* the viewer, while the work the viewer performs seems effortless. It is when the movie moves the viewer where

he/she wants to go, when the movie is understood and enjoyed in favorable conditions of reception. The good movie experience is the result of a viewing contract scrupulously observed by the producers, the exhibitors, and the consumers of the show.

I prefer the mundane adjective *good* to describe the experience in place of a more technical construction, because I wish to lean on the sense the terms *good mother* and *good dream* have taken in psychoanalysis, implying a sense of satisfaction for a subject who does not merely spectate but actively participates in the good of the experience.[6] It is an experience in which the subject not only receives the pleasure of the text but also co-produces it. But the primary reason to use this adjective is that when viewers have experienced pleasure at the movies, when they feel the movie has done what it is supposed to do, they exclaim, simply, "That's a good movie," collapsing all the various satisfactions into this single term.

My question here is: how can horror films provide this good movie experience? Outside the theater, fear, fright, and anxiety are not pleasant experiences. We suffer these emotional states, but we take no pleasure in them. Yet in the horror cinema, viewers enjoy being terrorized. The "bad" experience has become a "good" one. My question is not *why*? but *how*? More precisely, how are the sounds and images of this genre developed so that the viewer can gain pleasure in fear? And how do I, the viewer, work *with* the film to gain the pleasure it offers? How do I allow the movie to move me, to play with my emotions; how do I put myself into *its* field of play? Especially in contemporary horror—post-*Psycho* (1960)—how do I gain pleasure from the spectacle of rape, mutilation, enslavement, or death?

Clearly, there are many who find *no* pleasure in the terror film—only disgust. Some are unable to defend themselves against the horror of the images; the emotions aroused become too intense for viewers to accept, even though they know that the experience is fictional, that it is "only a movie." Other viewers displace themselves from the fiction by laughter, intentionally misreading the emotional cues of the text, refusing to play by the rules of its game.

When I was an undergraduate at Northwestern, my lover irritated me by her behavior at horror films. During the most terrifying scenes she would put her hands over her eyes. "I can't watch it," she would say; then, "tell me what's happening!" Apparently, there came a point at which the movie moved her too much—a point at which she was too open, too receptive, to the images. There came a point of stress—of

overload—at which she had to defend herself against the speech of the film. But not against all of its discourse. She still *heard* the horror—the groans of the monster, the screams of the victim, the pulse of the music. She chose to block her vision, not her ears. She wanted to see the movie, but she also wanted *not* to see when it began to deliver the vision it promised or threatened.

Metz, Heath, Baudry, and Mulvey have elaborated on the theory of the scopophilic drive as a major source of cinema pleasure—the viewer as voyeur, who watches the supposedly private acts of others from his/her hidden position in darkness.[7] But, to my knowledge, what has *not* been explored is the pleasure in *not seeing*—the delayed, blocked, or partial vision that seems so central to the strategy of horror cinema. In the "good dream," according to Masud Khan, the very structure of the dream enables the dreamer to achieve a "benign distancing" from traumatic images or ideas which, in the bad dream, would wake the dreamer in a panic.[8] Films are less dreams of a private subject than public fantasies appropriated by the viewer. But Laplanche, Pontalis, and Lagache have stressed that, while fantasy is the *mise-en-scène* of desire—of the wish—it is also produced by the subject's defenses *against* desire.[9] It is censored, distorted; the pleasurable fantasy is also the product of fear. As a compromised text, it protects the subject from the full implications of his/her unconscious (and primal) fantasies, while at the same time, it speaks these fantasies in a revised, "civilized" form. Others have spoken of cinema pleasure as the representation of desire, but little has been said about how specific films, genres, or cinema as an institution are the site of defensive operations.

PART 2

The contemporary terror film is often accused of visual excess—of showing too much too often. It is said to place excessive reliance on what Stephen King has called the "gross-out"—scenes engineered as sheer stimulus/response, producing shock and revulsion, as when the creature bursts from the chest of its human host in *Alien* (1979).[10] The full vision of the object of fright may be extended indefinitely in such films as *The Texas Chainsaw Massacre* (1974) or *The Exorcist* (1973), but in other films the image is only a brief payoff that proves that the thing is truly terrifying, that the promise of horror can and will be delivered. Typically, the moment of full vision fades once more into a

sequence of imagery that anticipates the return of the terrible object but evades it—refuses to face it openly. The quality of the effect changes as well. Presumably, the viewer's "excess" emotion of fright and disgust yields to a more diffuse anxiety in which dread of the return of full vision is commingled with desire for its return to the screen. It is this anticipatory vision—showing little or nothing of the true object of terror—that interests me here.

These are scenes that promise the monstrous, but no monster is visible. The viewer senses a terrible presence in the articulation of imagery, but the images themselves display only an *absence* of the terrible object, or the possibility that it may become visible. These are scenes invested with potential; scenes that toy with and frustrate the wish to see; veiled scenes of partial, blocked, or inadequate vision; delayed visions, even apparently empty visions in which one sees clearly, but there is nothing *significant* to see, no apparent purpose to the image.

The articulation of imagery from film to film is so flexible, so dependent on context, that I hesitate to speak of set visual codes. Better, perhaps, to call these images *figures*—devices or patterns of *figuration*—leaning on arguments advanced by Lyotard. Rather than being a decorative or ornamental "turn" (trope) of the discourse, as classical rhetoric would have it, the *figure* allows a more primary, preconscious or unconscious fantasy to contaminate and rework the ordered surface of the ostensible text.[11] The figure is a kind of overflow from an invisible scene onto the imagery of the film, so that what Heidegger or the expressionists might call the *stimmung*—the mood or "attunement" of the image—is bent by fear, desire and anticipation so that it "speaks" something more than it shows.[12] The figure of the delayed, partial, or empty vision ambiguates the image; it overlays the explicit significance of the scene with a monstrous presence which belongs to an *other* scene—a scene off-screen, and not fully conscious. The range of the imagery is so broad I can offer only an incomplete catalog of figures organized into loose categories.

In the first group of relatively common, straightforward figures, the viewer knows that the monster is already here, in the scene (in the room), about to attack the victim or actually attacking. However, the look at the monster is denied or frustrated. In the first instance, he (I say "he" because the monster is usually male) is excluded from the shot by framing. In *Alien* and *The Prophecy* (1979), the camera holds the victim in extreme close-up (ECU) "choker" shot just before the attack moves into its opening stages. We see the victim's reaction but

the reverse-angle vision of the threat is withheld. If and when the reverse angle is added to the figure, the first shot has become an instance of delayed or suspended vision. *Friday the 13th, Part 2* (1981) teases the viewer by cutting from an attack in progress to peaceful or playful scenes elsewhere in the camp, only to return, after several of these delaying shots, to the attack or its aftermath. The monster himself is visually present in the first part of the film only as a pair of feet in the foreground of the shot.

Another instance of the on-scene threat is the familiar shot, infinitely variable, in which the image of the monster is obscured by mist (*The Fog*, 1979), smoke (*Curse of the Demon*, aka *Night of the Demon*, 1957), or by the shadows of a chiaroscuro lighting pattern. *Poltergeist* (1982) transforms the convention by means of a masking "spectral light" (as one of the characters terms it). Overlit and overexposed shots, the light glaring into the camera, evoke an ambiguous *stimmung* of combined threat and wonder.[13]

In the second figural category, the potential victim approaches a site that the viewer believes to be inhabited by the monster. This figure prolongs the approach, dwells on the simple act of walking or climbing stairs in detail, fragmenting the banal act by a series of shots from a great variety of angles, often fragmenting the body of the victim with ECUs of "foot on the stair," "hand on the banister," combined with extreme long shots which momentarily reintegrate the body. Intercut into the series are shots of the victim's face and, usually, point-of-view (POV) shots from the victim's eyes of the empty staircase. No monster is visible, but the scene is overlaid with menace because of the elaborate visual treatment devoted to an ordinary act that would usually be without interest. The classic form of this figure is probably given in *Psycho* when Arbogast (Martin Balsam) ascends the staircase of the terrible house. (In Hitchcock's scene, the presence of the monster can be inferred from the "god's-eye" shot from high over the stairwell; it is not strictly taken from Norman Bates' POV but upper regions of the house have already been associated with him.) The majority of the so-called slasher films repeat this figure as a preliminary to the attack.

American Werewolf in London (1981) inserts a fast-moving dolly shot over the moors of Northern England into a scene in which the protagonist, David Kessler, is confined to a hospital bed in London. No monster or human is visible in the shot, but it apparently represents the vision of something or someone. The monster is present, momentarily, only as a point of view. Although David considers the insert to

Curse of the Demon *(aka* Night of the Demon*), 1957. The sight of the monster obscured. Still courtesy of Jerry Ohlinger's Movie Material Store.*

be only a disturbing fragment of a "dream," the viewer is cued by the title of the film to take the shot as evidence that the American has already (mentally) been transformed into the werewolf.

The third figural category is the most intriguing. Here, the viewer *knows* that the monster is not physically on the scene, may not even be near it, but the position or movement of the camera seems to contra-

dict this knowledge, overlaying the scene with a "sense" of the monstrous. Toward the beginning of the 1983 TV movie *The Demon Murder Case*, *before* the demon invades the film, a couple are conversing in their house. Although the sound is recorded as though the viewer/auditor were with them in the room, the shot is an extreme long shot of the exterior of the house, the camera gradually tracking from left to right. Instances of these motivated camera movements abound in the contemporary terror film, although this refusal to give even a partial vision of an innocent interpersonal scene is rare. In the changing visual codes of the horror film, the prowling or creeping camera has become associated with the vision of a monster preparing to attack. It is interpreted as a POV shot. Here (and in other films), no monster lurks on the scene, but since the movement has come to "speak" a threatening presence, a monstrous overtone contaminates an ordinary, more or less meaningless scene. Another common instance of the third category occurs when a character, usually seated, is performing an everyday act such as reading, talking on the phone, and so on.

Little of significance is happening or being spoken. Rather than offering a clear or full view of the subject, the camera is placed at an "unnatural" distance behind objects of decor which intrude into the frame in the foreground, creating either a visual barrier or, at the least, a distraction between the viewer and the person viewed. In this figure the camera sometimes looks from and through an area of darkness into an illuminated scene or, still viewing from a distance, performs unmotivated creeping movements around the static or sedentary subject. Again, the imagery carries a threatening overtone. In the opening scenes of *The Exorcist*, the Ellen Burstyn character is filmed in her living room through several variations of this figure.

PART 3

The creeping camera, the distant, partial, or blocked vision, the frame within the frame: in each of these instances of the third figure the viewer seems to be invited to look less at *what* is seen than at *how* it is seen. As Steven Heath writes, in another context, "What counts is as much the representation as the represented, is as much the production as the product."[14]

The means of representation—the manner or mode of viewing—is foregrounded, even fetishized. In effect, I believe that each of the fig-

ures (in all three categories) involves the viewer in a structure of fetishism. Indeed, a fetishistic structure may be more central to the horror genre than to cinema as a whole due to the greater need of horror cinema to defend the viewer against his or her own desire for full vision.

Film theory has made extensive use of the psychoanalytic description of fetishism as a key toward understanding the sexual positioning of the viewer which is invited by the visual text. Recently, I have begun to wonder if we haven't accorded too much respect to the letter of Freudian and Lacanian law while neglecting some of the more profound implications of Freud's attempt to deal with arrested vision, blocked and diverted desire, and the structure of disavowal. If, like Mulvey in "Visual Pleasure," we take the fetish as a memorial or monument to male castration anxiety, all kinds of problems are raised. In the classical view, invoked by Mulvey and others, the fetish is formed when the male child perceives that the female lacks a penis. He *has* a penis; therefore, she has been castrated. The vision proves that castration is possible. The boy fears that he too will meet the same fate, so he disavows the perception. He cannot totally refute the perception of absence. He "knows very well" that the woman does not have a penis, but cannot abide the knowledge, so he finds or "creates" a substitute for the female genital in order to avoid encountering the vision of absence.[15]

The fetishistic look in cinema cannot, according to Mulvey, take pleasure in looking at woman as an erotic object but must transform her into a spectacle satisfying in itself, as in the cinema of Von Sternberg. Dietrich is not to be penetrated or possessed, but looked at, admired. Once she has been reconstructed into an image, the female no longer threatens the male. To the fetishistic look, Mulvey opposed the "active" look of voyeurism, which seeks to penetrate, control, subdue the woman. Both forms of visual pleasure are essentially male, reflecting male control over the means of representation in our society, including the cinema.[16] As Mulvey admits in a later article on *Duel in the Sun* (1946), this theory offers little to explain transsexual identification in the viewing experience. When the female viewer identifies with the male position in the film, is she denying some "essential" femininity, or transforming that femininity from a passive to an active positioning?[17] Or is every viewer more or less bisexual when forming identifications during the viewing experience? I would provisionally argue the latter, but insofar as the characters/personae offered by Hol-

lywood for identification are traditionally male—active, masculine identity comes to be confused with action/aggression and the feminine with passion, suffering, and the masochistic position. Description of sexual sites and roles in film theory is not only contaminated by the sexual "assignments" given by traditional culture, but with the political assumption that activity is preferable to passivity in cinema, as in life.

A second problem with theories of fetishism in cinema involves taking the penis too literally—too physically—as the male sexual organ. Fetishism is capable of being extended outside of its strict sense of a psychotic sexual perversion only if we substitute the term *phallus* for penis. Phallus is cultural, rather than physical, representing all the symbolic values attached to the penis—connotations of potency, penetration, invasion, aggression.

A strict clinical view of fetishism would also run aground when confronted with sadomasochistic cinemas of display like hard-core pornography and (sometimes) the horror film. There is no question that pornography is voyeuristic, that it is an erotically charged cinema that wishes to control the woman, but it also wishes to look at her at leisure, to put her on display. Yet Mulvey claims that the voyeuristic look is opposed to the fetishistic.[18] Second, the pornographic gaze finds pleasure, not horror, in the spectacle of the castrated, naked vagina. It delights in the absence of the penis, in part because the woman's lack affirms the male's potency. He has it, she doesn't—which recognition justifies the humiliation of the woman.[19]

I believe it is more useful, particularly when dealing with horror cinema, to broaden the sense of fetishism, while still remaining within a psychoanalytic framework. Let us set the question of sexual difference aside, momentarily, and see fetishism as an arrested or blocked vision which has recoiled from, or fears to approach *any* image of horror (not necessarily the horror of the castrated woman). The Freudian notion of fetishism involves a substitution of signifiers: the fetish both *re*-presents and hides what the subject really *wants* to see but it is also the symptom of fear of looking. The fetishistic act is the means by which the subject protects himself/herself against a horrible spectacle, and gains pleasure from a vision which stops short of this spectacle. It is essentially a defensive vision, but one which is enjoyed by the spectator precisely *because* it lurks on the threshold, because it refuses to fully see.

When my friend at Northwestern held her hands over her eyes to

prevent full vision of the image of horrible excess upon the screen, she was gaining a pleasure similar to that of the fetishist. (Sometimes she peeked through her fingers to achieve a partial vision in place of a completely blocked one.) In any case, she defended herself against the image. But through its figures of blocked, partial, and delayed vision horror cinema *itself* defends the viewer from the vision of the monstrous that we know lurks somewhere beyond the substitute images we see before us on the screen. The horror is screened, but in the scenes I have mentioned it is also screened off. In other words, horror is screened in the process of screening it off.

In fetishism, one disavows an absence, relocates it in an *other* scene, and treats it as a presence. Not wanting to see the absence, the fetishist-as-viewer imposes a presence upon a neutral object or scene and invests (cathects) it with the desired, fantasmatic qualities which give the promise of pleasure. Now this is complex and approximate, but what I rightly or wrongly call the "figures" of horror cinema seem to presume that the viewer wants a full vision of horror and simultaneously does *not* want to see it screened. This is somewhat different from the strict view of fetishism, since, in the case of horror cinema, a *long* look at the object of terror tends to rob this object of its traumatic qualities. The viewer "knows" that the more he/she stares, the more the terror will dissipate—to the extent that the image of full horror will be revealed (unveiled) as more constructed, more artificial, more a fantasy, more a *fiction* than the fiction which prepares and exhibits it. To look the horror in the face for very long robs it of its power.

I suggest that the viewer does not want, or *should* not want, to doubt the terror of the terrible. So through this figural *seepage* from another, absent scene, the film overlays horror into scenes of apparent nonhorror in order to: (a) *protect* the viewer from the excess of the traumatic vision; (b) *inoculate* the viewer to accept the full vision, when, long delayed, it is screened; and (c) *protect itself against the viewer* by delaying or withholding the full vision of horror and by permitting the horror to bleed through the figures into empty scenes; it obtains a capital gain—pleasure for the viewer, profit for the industry—by refusing the viewer's scopophilia while yet allowing the drive to *almost* see—to almost find its object.

Seeing through not seeing; vision refused through vision given. To me, the most fascinating aspect of "everyday" cinema is the way in which it denies the pleasures it promises, while delivering them through the back door. This defensive strategy of pleasure, in which

the viewer collaborates, is not confined to horror cinema. But because this is a genre that promises excess—trauma—the figures of defense are more obvious here.

AFTERWORD

In this short analysis of some of the ways in which horror cinema defends viewers against their own desire, I do not pretend to give a complete account of the conventions and codes of the genre. Like the theorists of scopophilia, I have dealt only with visual communication. Sound plays a crucial role in horror film by filling in the relatively empty visuals with suggestions of menace. Often, sound works to reinforce or intensify the threat of the visual figure. In other cases, the presence of the monster is given entirely through the soundtrack, as when heavy breathing or the unresolved repetitive motifs of suspense music are overlaid onto an apparently innocent scene. In the latter strategy, sound functions not to cue the viewer/auditor how to interpret the visuals but, like the visual figures outlined here, communicates an *other* scene while yet withholding it from full presence. The text invites the viewer simultaneously to respond to two contradictory "realities" of discourse, while allowing either message to be disavowed as *more* fictional than the other "track" of the fiction.

NOTES

1. This condensed account of contemporary reception theory leans heavily on the work of Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). See also Susan R. Suleiman, "Introduction: Varieties of Audience-Oriented Criticism," in *The Reader in the Text*, ed. Suleiman and Inge Crosman (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), for a broad account of the issues involved.

2. "Realization" translates Roman Ingarden's term *Konkretisation*—the process by which individual readers, listeners, or viewers engage and activate the text.

3. In his 1975 "Histoire/discours," Christian Metz proposed that the vision of the viewer (as voyeur) is "the seeing of an outlaw, of an *Id* unrelated to any *Ego*." Trans. as "Story/discourse. A Note on Two Kinds of Voyeurism," in *The Imaginary Signifier*, ed. Metz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 97. My emphasis here is on the limits, not the omnipotence, of viewing.

4. J. B. Pontalis, "Dream as Object," *International Review of Psycho-Analysis*, 1 (London, 1974): 132.

5. When the dream becomes a nightmare, dreamers sometimes utilize the protective shield of "the dream screen" to ward off its content in place of the usual defense of waking up. My assumption here is that although the feature film is more analogous to the daydream than to the dream, the producers of the fantasy (Hollywood—the industry) do not want the viewer to "wake up" during the film. When pleasure threatens to move over the edge into unpleasure, discomfort, Hollywood provides some approximation of the dream screen in order that the viewer will not repudiate the excess of the promise—reject the film or leave the theatre. Hollywood promotes easy pleasures even when it promotes the spectacle of pain verging on sadomasochism, but, at the last minute, withholding it. Cf. Bertram Lewin, "Sleep, the Mouth, and the Dream Screen," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 15 (1946): 419–34, on the psychoanalytic concept.

6. Cf. M. Masud R. Khan, "The Changing Use of Dreams in Psychoanalytical Practice," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 57 (1976): 324–30.

7. Metz, *The Imaginary Signifier*, Chaps. 3 and 4, and "Story/Discourse"; Stephen Heath, "Narrative Space" and "Body, Voice," in *Questions of Cinema* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981); Jean-Louis Baudry, "The Apparatus," *camera obscura*, no. 1 (1976): 104–26; and Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," *Screen* 16, no. 3 (1975): 6–18.

8. Khan, "The Changing Use of Dreams."

9. Jean Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis* (New York: Norton, 1973), 314–18; Daniel Lagache, "Fantasy, Reality and Truth," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 45 (1964): 180–89.

10. Stephen King, *Danse Macabre* (New York: Everest House, 1981).

11. Jean Francois Lyotard, "The Psychoanalytical Approach," in *Main Trends in Aesthetics and the Sciences of Art*, ed. Mikel Dufrenne (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), 134–50.

12. Cf. Lotte Eisner, *The Haunted Screen* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 199–206.

13. Tobe Hooper is the director of record, but *Poltergeist* is clearly controlled by Steven Spielberg. The "spectral light" motif was first introduced in *Close Encounters of the Third Kind* (1977) to render the alien presence more wondrous. In *Poltergeist*, the light both threatens and attracts.

14. Heath, "Negative Space," in *Questions of Cinema*, 51.

15. The best accounts of fetishism within the framework of classical psychoanalysis are Sigmund Freud, "Fetishism," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. and ed. James Strachey, vol. 21 (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1961): 147–57; and Z. Alexander Aarons, "Fetish, Fact and Fantasy: A Clinical Study of the Problems of Fetishism," *International Review of Psychoanalysis*, vol. 2 (1972): 199–203.

16. Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," 13–18.

17. Mulvey, "Afterthoughts on 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' Inspired by *Duel in the Sun*," *Framework*, nos. 15–17 (1981), 12–15. Mulvey rejects the idea "that a hidden, as yet undiscovered femininity exists," but argues that "Hollywood genre films structured around masculine pleasure, offering an identification with the *active* point of view, allow a woman spectator to rediscover that lost aspect of her sexual identity, the never fully repressed bedrock of feminine neurosis" (p. 13).

18. Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema."

19. Cf. Dennis Giles, "Pornographic Space: The Other Place," *1977 Film Studies Annual*, Part 2 (Pleasantville, N.Y.: Redgrave, 1977), 52–66.